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Abstract
A recent breakthrough of Liu and Pass (FOCS’20) shows that one-way functions exist if and only if
the (polynomial-)time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity, Kt, is bounded-error hard on average to
compute. In this paper, we strengthen this result and extend it to other complexity measures:
We show, perhaps surprisingly, that the KT complexity is bounded-error average-case hard if
and only if there exist one-way functions in constant parallel time (i.e. NC0). This result crucially
relies on the idea of randomized encodings. Previously, a seminal work of Applebaum, Ishai, and
Kushilevitz (FOCS’04; SICOMP’06) used the same idea to show that NC0-computable one-way
functions exist if and only if logspace-computable one-way functions exist.
Inspired by the above result, we present randomized average-case reductions among the NC1-
versions and logspace-versions of Kt complexity, and the KT complexity. Our reductions preserve
both bounded-error average-case hardness and zero-error average-case hardness. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first reduction between the KT complexity and a variant of Kt
complexity.
We prove tight connections between the hardness of Kt complexity and the hardness of (the
hardest) one-way functions. In analogy with the Exponential-Time Hypothesis and its variants,
we define and motivate the Perebor Hypotheses for complexity measures such as Kt and KT. We
show that a Strong Perebor Hypothesis for Kt implies the existence of (weak) one-way functions
of near-optimal hardness 2n−o(n). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first construction of
one-way functions of near-optimal hardness based on a natural complexity assumption about a
search problem.
We show that a Weak Perebor Hypothesis for MCSP implies the existence of one-way functions,
and establish a partial converse. This is the first unconditional construction of one-way functions
from the hardness of MCSP over a natural distribution.
Finally, we study the average-case hardness of MKtP. We show that it characterizes cryp-
tographic pseudorandomness in one natural regime of parameters, and complexity-theoretic
pseudorandomness in another natural regime.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Backgrounds and Motivation
1.1.1 Meta-Complexity
Let µ be a complexity measure, such as the circuit size of a Boolean function or the time-
bounded Kolmogorov complexity of a string. Traditional complexity theory studies the
complexity measure on fixed functions, e.g. the AC0 complexity of the Parity function. In
contrast, we study the meta-complexity problem associated with µ: given an input function,
what is its µ value?
Meta-complexity problems are fundamental to theoretical computer science and have been
studied since the very beginning of the discipline [81]. They have connections to several areas
of theoretical computer science, including circuit lower bounds, learning, meta-mathematics,
average-case complexity, and cryptography. However, our knowledge about them is still very
limited compared to our knowledge of other fundamental problems such as the Satisfiability
problem.
Some of the basic complexity questions about meta-complexity include:
Is computing a given measure µ complete for some natural complexity class? For example,
is the Minimum Circuit Size Problem (MCSP, [58]) NP-complete?
Can we show unconditional circuit lower bounds for computing µ, at least for weak circuit
classes? Can we distinguish truth tables with 2o(n)-size circuits from random truth tables
by a small AC0[2] circuit?
Is deciding whether µ is at least some parameter k robust to the choice of the parameter
k? Let MCSP[s(n)] denote the problem of whether an input function (represented as
a truth table) has circuit complexity at most s(n); are MCSP[2n/2] and MCSP[2n/3]
computationally equivalent?
How do low-level definitional issues affect the complexity of µ? Does the complexity
of the time-bounded version of Kolmogorov complexity (“Kt”) depend on the universal
Turing machine that defines it?
For which pairs of measures µ and µ′ can we show that the problem of computing µ
reduces to the problem of computing µ′? Can we reduce computing the time-bounded
version of Kolmogorov complexity to computing circuit complexity?
There has been much interest in recent years in these questions. While there has been some
progress on answering these questions affirmatively for specific measures [4, 48, 3, 6, 72, 43, 34,
40, 46, 47], there are also barriers to understanding these questions better, such as our inability
to prove circuit lower bounds [58, 66] and the magnification phenomenon [73, 71, 65, 22].
Many of the above questions such as the NP-completeness of MCSP remain wide open.
1.1.2 Cryptography
A fundamental question in cryptography is whether one-way functions exist. We have been
quite successful at basing one-way functions on the hardness of specific problems, such as
factoring [75], discrete logarithm [25], and some lattice problems [1]. One problem with this
approach, however, is that we have little complexity-theoretic evidence for the hardness of
these problems (for example, they are unlikely to be NP-hard). The most compelling evidence
for their hardness so far is simply that we have not been able to find efficient algorithms
for them.
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Can we base the existence of one-way functions on firm complexity-theoretic assumptions?
A “holy-grail” in this direction would be to construct one-way functions assuming (only)
NP ̸⊆ BPP [25]. This goal remains elusive, and there are several obstacles to its resolution:
Unless PH collapses, non-adaptive “black-box” reductions cannot transform worst-case
hardness of NP into average-case hardness of NP [17]. As the latter is necessary for
one-way functions, this barrier result demonstrates limits of such “black-box” reductions
on basing one-way function from worst-case assumptions such as NP ̸⊆ BPP. For the
task of constructing one-way functions (instead of just a hard-on-average problem in NP),
stronger barrier results are known [2, 67].
Even the seemingly easier task of basing one-way functions from average-case hardness of
NP remains elusive. Indeed, Impagliazzo [50] called a world “Pessiland” where NP is hard
on average but one-way functions do not exist. It is not hard to construct a relativized
Pessiland [87], therefore a relativization barrier exists even for this “easier” task.
1.1.3 The Liu-Pass Result
Very recently, in a breakthrough result, Liu and Pass [62] showed an equivalence between the
existence of one-way functions and the bounded-error average-case hardness of computing the
Kt complexity (the Kolmogorov complexity of a string with respect to a given polynomial
time bound t) over the uniform distribution. This result is significant for several reasons.
From the perspective of cryptography, it establishes the first equivalence between the
existence of one-way functions and the average-case complexity of a natural problem
over a natural distribution. Such an equivalence result bases cryptography on firmer
complexity-theoretic foundations.
From the perspective of meta-complexity, it enables robustness results for the complexity of
Kt in the average-case setting. Indeed, [62] proved that approximating the Kt complexity
of a string or finding an optimal description for a string are both equivalent to the problem
of computing the Kt complexity.
More generally, such connections suggest the possibility of new and non-trivial average-
case reductions between natural problems on natural distributions, which is by itself an
important goal in average-case complexity theory. Several of the most basic questions in
this area remain open: Is random 3-SAT as hard as random 4-SAT (or vice versa)? Is
the decision version of Planted Clique as hard as its search version?1
Given these motivations, it is natural to ask if the main result of [62] can be extended to
other meta-complexity problems. For example, is the average-case hardness of MCSP also
equivalent to the existence of one-way functions? There is a “Kolmogorov-version” of circuit
complexity, named KT, which is more “fine-grained” than circuit complexity [4]. Maybe this
problem is also closely related to the existence of one-way functions? What about Levin’s Kt
complexity [60]?2
1 The decision version of Planted Clique is to distinguish Erdős-Rényi random graphs from graphs with a
planted clique; the search version is to find the planted clique.
2 See Definition 14 for the precise definitions of Kt, KT, and Kt.
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1.2 Our Contributions
We give strong positive answers to the above questions. We show somewhat surprisingly
that the average-case hardness of KT complexity is equivalent to the existence of one-way
functions computable in fast parallel time.3 For MCSP, we obtain weaker results: exponential
hardness of computing circuit size over the uniform distribution implies the existence of
one-way functions, and there is a partial converse. Bounded-error average-case complexity of
Kt complexity turns out to be equivalent to the existence of one-way functions in one natural
setting of parameters (despite the fact that computing Kt in the worst case is EXP-hard [4]),
and equivalent to the existence of complexity-theoretic pseudorandom generators in another
natural setting of parameters.
We also extend the connection between the hardness of Kt complexity and one-way
functions to the high end of the parametric regime – this yields one-way functions of almost
optimal hardness from plausible assumptions about the hardness of Kt complexity. We define
and motivate the Perebor Hypotheses4, which are average-case analogues of the Exponential-
Time Hypothesis and its variants for meta-complexity problems, stating that there is no
better way to solve meta-complexity problems than brute force search. This is a conceptual
contribution of this work, and we expect these hypotheses to have further applications to
cryptography, average-case complexity, and fine-grained complexity.
We now describe our results in more detail.
1.2.1 Connections between Meta-Complexity and One-Way Functions
Our main result is an equivalence between “parallel cryptography” and the average-case
hardness of MKTP:
▶ Theorem 1 (Main Result; Informal). There is a one-way function computable in uniform
NC1 if and only if KT is bounded-error hard on average.
The class “uniform NC1” in the above theorem is somewhat arbitrary since [11] proved
that the existence of one-way functions in ⊕L implies the existence of one-way functions in
NC0.5
For comparison, Liu and Pass [62] showed an equivalence between (“sequential”) crypto-
graphy and the average-case hardness of time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity (Kt).
▶ Theorem 2 (Main Result of [62]). There is a one-way function if and only if for some
polynomial t, Kt is bounded-error hard on average.
Theorem 2 shows that the one-way function defined based on hardness of Kt is a natural
universal one-way function.6 Similarly, Theorem 1 shows that the one-way function we define
based on the hardness of KT is a natural universal one-way function in NC1.
3 Due to a result in [11], the “fast parallel time” here can be interpreted as either NC0 or NC1. We
also point the reader to Benny Applebaum’s book Cryptography in Constant Parallel Time [8], which
inspired the title of the current paper.
4 Our terminology is inspired by Trakhtenbrot’s survey [81] on work in the former Soviet Union aiming to
show that various meta-complexity problems require brute force search to solve. “Perebor” roughly
means “by exhaustive search” in Russian.
5 ⊕L is the class of problems solvable by a parity Turing machine with O(log n) space. This class contains
both NC1 and L (log-space).
6 An artificial universal one-way function can be defined by enumerating uniform algorithms and concat-
enating their outputs [61, 30].
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As a corollary, the classical open question of whether polynomial-time computable one-
way functions imply one-way functions in NC0 is equivalent to the question of whether
average-case hardness of Kt implies average-case hardness of KT.
Results for MCSP. The KT complexity was defined as a variant of Kolmogorov-complexity
that resembles circuit complexity [4]. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether our equivalence
also holds for circuit complexity.
It turns out that circuit complexity is less convenient to deal with. Nevertheless, we still
proved non-trivial analogues of Theorem 1, as follows:
▶ Theorem 3 (Informal). The following are true:
If MCSP is exponentially hard on average, then there is a (super-polynomially hard)
one-way function.
If there is an exponentially hard weak one-way function in NC0, then MCSP is (exponen-
tially) hard on average.
For the technical difficulties of handling circuit complexity, the reader is referred to
Section 6 (and in particular Remark 76).
Results for MKtP. We also observe that the existence of (polynomial-time computable)
one-way functions can be characterized by the bounded-error average-case complexity of Kt.
▶ Theorem 4. There is a one-way function if and only if Kt is bounded-error hard on
average.
This result may seem surprising as computing Kt is EXP-hard under polynomial-size
reductions [4]. This is true even for any oracle that is a zero-error heuristic for computing
Kt. In contrast, we show that the bounded-error average-case complexity of Kt is captured
by one-way functions, a notion that seems much “easier” than EXP.
The harder direction in Theorem 4 is to construct a one-way function from hardness of Kt.
How could we construct a one-way function from merely a hard problem in exponential time?
The crucial insight is as follows: For most strings x ∈ {0, 1}n whose optimal Kt complexity is
witnessed by a machine d and a time bound t where Kt(x) = |d|+ log t, we have t ≤ poly(n).
We refer the reader to Section 2.1.2 and Section 7 for more details.
Note that Theorem 4 can also be seen as a characterization of cryptographic pseu-
dorandomness, by the known equivalence between one-way functions and cryptographic
pseudorandomness [38]. In a different regime of parameters, average-case hardness of Kt
turns out to capture the existence of complexity-theoretic pseudorandom generators, which
are pseudorandom generators with non-trivial seed length computable in exponential time.
Thus the average-case complexity of a single problem (Kt) can be used to capture both
cryptographic pseudorandomness and complexity-theoretic pseudorandomness!
▶ Theorem 5 (Informal). For each ϵ > 0, there is a pseudo-random generator from nϵ bits to
n bits computable in time 2nϵpoly(n) secure against poly(n) size circuits iff for each c > 1/2
there are no polynomial-size circuits solving Kt on more than 1− 2−cn fraction of inputs of
length n.
1.2.2 Application in Meta-Complexity: Robustness Theorems
We exploit the connection between MKTP and parallel cryptography to establish more
robustness results for meta-complexity. It is known that parallel cryptography is extremely
robust: L-computable one-way functions exist, if and only if NC1-computable one-way
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functions exist, if and only if NC0-computable one-way functions exist [11]. We define L- and
NC1-variants of Kt complexity, and translate the result in [11] to the following robustness
theorem:
▶ Theorem 6 (Bounded-Error Robustness of Meta-Complexity; Informal). The following
statements are equivalent:
KT is bounded-error hard on average.
For t1(n) := n10, the search version of NC1-Kt1 is bounded-error hard on average.
For t2(n) := 5n, L-Kt2 is bounded-error hard on average to approximate, within an
additive error of 100 log n.
It is natural to ask whether the above theorem can be interpreted as a reduction. Somewhat
surprisingly, we show the answer is yes! We discover an average-case reduction from L-Kt to
MKTP, as follows:
▶ Theorem 7 (Informal). Let n, t be parameters, m := poly(n, t). There is a randomized
reduction Red(x) that maps a length-n input to a length-m input, and satisfies the following
property:
Given a uniform random input x of length n, Red(x) produces a uniform random string
of length m.
Given a string x such that L-Kt(x) is small, for every possible randomness used in Red,
the KT complexity of Red(x) is also small.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first reduction from a variant of Kt complexity to
a variant of KT complexity. The only special property of L that we use is that L-computable
functions have perfect randomized encodings [11]. If polynomial-time computable functions
have such perfect randomized encodings, then our techniques imply an average-case reduction
from the (standard) Kt complexity to the KT complexity.
We have focused on the bounded-error average-case complexity of meta-complexity
problems so far. However, Theorem 7 also implies robustness in the zero-error regime. Here,
let MKTP[s] be the problem of determining whether the input x satisfies KT(x) ≤ s(|x|),
and let MINKt[s] be the problem of determining whether the input x satisfies Kt(x) ≤ s(|x|).
▶ Theorem 8 (Zero-Error Robustness of Meta-Complexity; Informal). Among the following
items, we have (1) ⇐⇒ (2), and both items are implied by (3).
1. There is a constant c > 0 such that NC1-MINKt1 [n−c log n] is zero-error easy on average.
2. There is a constant c > 0 such that L-MINKt2 [n− c log n] is zero-error easy on average.
3. There is a constant c > 0 such that MKTP[n− c log n] is zero-error easy on average.
1.2.3 Application in Cryptography: Maximally Hard One-Way Functions
How hard can a one-way function be? The standard definition of one-way functions only
requires that no polynomial-time adversary inverts a random output except with negligible
probability. However, it is conceivable that some one-way function requires 2n/poly(n) time
to invert (say, on a constant fraction of inputs)!
The results of [62] opens up the possibility to characterize the hardest one-way functions
by the meta-complexity of Kolmogorov complexity. In particular, the existence of maximally
hard one-way functions may be equivalent to the “Perebor” hypothesis, i.e. some meta-
complexity problem requires brute force to solve.
In this work, we tighten the connection between weak one-way functions (for which it is
hard to invert a random instance w.p. 1 − 1/poly(n)) and the hardness of Kt complexity.
We managed to show a very tight result:
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▶ Theorem 9 (Informal). For every constant α > 0, there exists a weak one-way function
with hardness 2(1−o(1))αn if and only if Kt complexity is hard on average for algorithms of
size 2(1−o(1))αn.
Note that the two α’s in the exponent (1− o(1))αn are the same. That is, we essentially
construct the best (weak) one-way functions from the hardness of Kt complexity.
We also attempted to strengthen the relationship between one-way functions in NC0 and
the hardness of KT complexity. Our result is that exponentially-hard weak one-way functions
in NC0 imply exponential hardness of KT.
▶ Theorem 10 (Informal). If there is a weak one-way function in NC0 with hardness 2Ω(n),
then KT requires 2Ω(n) size to solve on average.
Finally, we put forward a few Perebor Hypotheses. These hypotheses assert brute-force
search is unavoidable for solving meta-complexity problems such as Kt and KT, and are
closely related to the maximum hardness of (weak) one-way functions. See Section 5.5 for
more details.
1.3 Related Work
There have been several previous works connecting meta-complexity to cryptography. Im-
pagliazzo and Levin [51] show that the existence of one-way functions is equivalent to the
hardness of a certain learning task related to time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity. Oliveira
and Santhanam [72] show a dichotomy between learnability and cryptographic pseudorandom-
ness in the non-uniform setting: there is a non-trivial non-uniform learner for polynomial-size
Boolean circuits iff there is no exponentially secure distribution on functions computable
by polynomial-size circuits. Santhanam [76] proves an equivalence between the existence
of one-way functions and the non-existence of natural proofs under a certain universality
assumption about succinct pseudorandom distributions. We note here that the non-existence
of natural proofs is equivalent to the zero-error average-case hardness of MCSP.
None of the above results gives an unconditional equivalence between the average-case
hardness of a natural decision problem and the existence of one-way functions. This was
finally achieved by Liu and Pass [62], who showed that the weak hardness of Kpoly over the
uniform distribution is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions. [62] leaves open
whether there are similar connections between one-way functions and the hardness of other
meta-complexity problems such as KT and MCSP over the uniform distribution. In this
work, we show such connections to parallel cryptography, i.e., to the existence of one-way
functions in NC1, which by [11] is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions in NC0.
There is an extensive literature on parallel cryptography, beginning with the work of [11].
We refer to [8] and [9] for further information.
Our work also relates to average-case meta-complexity, which was first studied explicitly
in [43]. [43] essentially observe that the identity reduction trivially reduces µ to µ′ over
the uniform distribution in a zero-error average-case sense, where µ and µ′ are any two
meta-complexity measures such that µ′(x) ≤ µ(x) ≤ |x|+ O(log(|x|)) for all x. In this work
(particularly Sections 4.3 and 4.4), we give several non-trivial examples of zero-error and
bounded-error average-case reductions between meta-complexity problems.
Concurrent works of [63] and [5]. We now discuss the relationship of our work with the
concurrent works of [63] and [5], which overlap in some respects with ours.
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Liu and Pass [63] show an equivalence between the bounded-error weak average-case
hardness of Kt over the uniform distribution and the existence of one-way functions - this
is essentially the same as our Theorem 4. They also show that the zero-error average-case
hardness of Kt over the uniform distribution is equivalent to EXP ̸= BPP. In contrast, our
Theorem 5 gives an equivalence between the bounded-error average-case hardness of Kt
over the uniform distribution in a different parametric regime and the worst-case hardness
of EXP, where the hardness in each case is with respect to non-uniform adversaries. The
somewhat surprising message of both sets of results is the same: a minor variation on an
average-case complexity assumption that is equivalent to the worst-case hardness of EXP
implies the existence of one-way functions.
[63] also give characterizations of parallel cryptography but they do this using space-
bounded Kolmogorov complexity and the conditional version thereof. Their work does not
contain any results relating to the hardness of KT or MCSP.
Allender, Cheraghchi, Myrisiotis, Tirumala, and Volkovich [5] relate the average-case
hardness of the conditional version of KT complexity over the uniform distribution to the
existence of one-way functions. They show that if the conditional version is hard on a
polynomial fraction of instances, then one-way functions exist. They also give a weak
converse: if one-way functions exist, then the conditional version of KT is hard on an
exponential fraction of instances. In contrast, we characterize parallel cryptography by the
average-case hardness of KT.
1.4 Organization
Section 2 presents some of our main ideas and techniques. Section 3 provides basic definitions
and preliminaries.
The equivalence between the existence of NC0-computable one-way functions and the
hardness of KT complexity is proved in Section 4. We prove our robustness results in
Section 4.3 and 4.4. In Section 5, we present the tight connection between the hardness of
Kt complexity and maximally hard one-way functions. To motivate future study, we put
forward a few Perebor Hypotheses in Section 5.5, which are closely related to the existence of
maximally-hard one-way functions. The results related to MCSP are proved in Section 6, and
the results related to MKtP are proved in Section 7. Finally, we leave a few open questions
in Section 8.
2 Intuitions and Techniques
For strings s1, s2, . . . , sn, we use s1 ◦ s2 ◦ · · · ◦ sn to denote their concatenation.
2.1 Parallel Cryptography and the Hardness of KT
Our proof of Theorem 1 builds on [62]. However, it turns out that we need new ideas for
both directions of the equivalence.
2.1.1 Hardness of KT from One-Way Functions in NC0
We first review how Liu and Pass [62] proved that one-way functions imply average-case
hardness of Kt.
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Any cryptographically-secure PRG G implies zero-error hardness of Kt [74, 58, 4]. Roughly
speaking, the outputs of G have “non-trivial” Kt complexity, but random strings are likely to
have “trivial” Kt complexity.7 If there is a polynomial-time (zero-error) heuristic for Kt, this
heuristic will recognize most random strings as “trivial”, but recognize every output of G as
“non-trivial”. Thus, we can use it as a distinguisher for G, contradicting the security of G.
It is crucial in the above argument that our heuristic does not make mistakes. If the
outputs of G are “sparse” and our heuristic has two-sided error, our heuristic could also
recognize the outputs of G as “non-trivial”. (Here, a PRG G with output length n is sparse
if the number of possible outputs of G is significantly smaller than 2n.) In this case, the
heuristic may still be correct on most length-n strings, but fail to distinguish the outputs of
G from true random strings.
Why not make G dense? This is the core idea of Liu and Pass. In particular, from an
arbitrary one-way function f , they constructed a dense PRG G,8 and used G to argue that
Kt is bounded-error average-case hard. Roughly speaking, if the outputs of G occupy a
1/poly(n) fraction of {0, 1}n, then any bounded-error heuristic for Kt with error probability
1/nω(1) is a distinguisher for G. It follows from the security of G that Kt is bounded-error
hard on average.
What about KT? Recall that the KT complexity of a string x is the minimum of |d|+ t
over programs d and integers t such that x can be generated implicitly from d in at most t
steps, i.e., the universal machine computes the i-th bit xi of x correctly in at most t steps
with oracle access to d. When we use the above framework to analyze the hardness of KT
complexity, there is a problem: the outputs of G might have “trivial” KT complexity.
Let t be the running time of G (which is a large polynomial). Let out := G(seed) be any
output of G, we can see that Kt(out) is indeed non-trivial, as we can describe seed and the
code of G with |seed|+ O(1) < n bits. Given this description, we can “decompress” out in
t(n) steps by computing G on seed. However, KT(out) is the sum of the description length
and the running time, which is |seed|+ O(log n) + t(n) ≫ n. This is even worse than the
trivial description for out whose complexity is n + O(log n).
One attempt is to pad both the seed and the output by a random string of length
poly(t(n)), so that G becomes sublinear-time computable. That is, G′(seed ◦ r) = out ◦ r
where r is a long string. Still, we only have KT(out ◦ r) ≤ |seed|+ |r|+ t(n), but the trivial
upper bound for KT(out ◦ r) is only |out|+ |r|. If t(n) is larger than the stretch of G (i.e.,
|out| − |seed|), then we do not have non-trivial KT-complexity upper bounds on outputs
of G.
This problem is inherent as we need G to be dense. Suppose that the number of possible
outputs of G is 2n/poly(n), then there must be an output of G whose Kolmogorov complexity
is at least n−O(log n). That is, the seed length of G has to be n−O(log n), even if we place
no restrictions on the complexity of G! Now, if we want the outputs of G to have non-trivial
KT complexity, we only have O(log n) time to compute each output bit of G. Therefore, G
is a PRG in constant parallel time.9
7 Here, the Kt (or KT) complexity of a length-n string is “non-trivial”, if it is at most n − Ω(log n). Most
length-n strings have complexity at least n − Ω(log n); every length-n string has complexity at most
n + O(log n) (justifying the word “trivial”).
8 The input distribution of their PRG is not the uniform distribution, which is different from standard
PRGs; see Definition 24. We ignore this difference in the informal exposition.
9 Due to low-level issues in the computational models, the “constant time” in [8] actually corresponds to
O(log n) time in this paper. See Section 3.1 for details.
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We discovered that the (bounded-error) average-case complexity of KT is related to
cryptography in NC0. Now it is easy to see that NC0-computable dense PRGs imply bounded-
error hardness of KT complexity. We can construct such a PRG from NC0-computable
one-way functions, as follows.10 We first use [62] to construct a dense PRG G. This PRG
is not necessarily in NC0, as [62] needs some more complex primitives (e.g. extractors).
Nevertheless, we can apply the randomized encodings in [11] to compile G into a PRG
in NC0.
2.1.2 One-Way Functions in NC0 from Hardness of KT
It is straightforward to construct a one-way function from hardness of KT, using techniques
of [62, Section 4]. Roughly speaking, the one-way function f receives two inputs d, t, where
d is the description of a machine, and t is a time bound. Let x be the string such that for
each i ∈ [n], xi is equal to the output bit of d(i) for t steps. We define f(d, t) := (|d|+ t, x).
An inverter, on input (ℓ, x), is required to find a description of x with complexity at most ℓ,
thus it needs to solve MKTP. (All one-way functions in this section are weak, meaning they
cannot be inverted efficiently on a 1− 1/poly(n) fraction of inputs.)
There is one problem: f is not in NC0. By [11], it suffices to construct a one-way function
in ⊕L, but f is also not in ⊕L (unless ⊕L = P).
Our idea is to only consider typical inputs, and throw away the atypical ones. In particular,
for most strings x, the values of t in the optimal description of KT(x) = |d|+ t are small.
(We have t = O(log n) for every string x with Kolmogorov complexity at least n−O(log n).)
We call an input typical if its value of t is at most O(log n). If KT is (bounded-error) hard
on average, then it is also hard on average conditioned on the input being typical.
Therefore, we place the restriction that t ≤ c log n in our one-way function f , where c is
a constant depending on the hardness of KT. We can still base the hardness of f on the
hardness of KT. More importantly, f is computable in space complexity O(c log n), and we
obtain a one-way function in NC0 by [11].
2.2 Applebaum-Ishai-Kushilevitz as a Reduction
For any “reasonable” circuit class C, we can use [62] to show that the existence of one-way
functions computable in C is equivalent to the hardness of C-Kt. (The precise definition of
C-Kt is beyond the scope of this paper, but NC1-Kt and L-Kt are defined in Definition 15.)
Now, let us review the main results of [11]: ⊕L-computable one-way functions exist if and
only if NC0-computable one-way functions exist. In other words, ⊕L-Kt is hard on average if
and only if NC0-Kt is hard on average!11
It is natural to ask whether there is a reduction between ⊕L-Kt and NC0-Kt. It turns out
that the answer is yes! In this section, we describe this reduction without using the language
of one-way functions. This reduction is randomized, reduces any string with non-trivial
⊕L-Kt complexity to a string with non-trivial NC0-Kt complexity, and reduces a random
string to a random string. Although it may not be a worst-case reduction, it establishes
non-trivial equivalence results between average-case complexities of ⊕L-Kt and NC0-Kt.
10 Note that this is different from [38, 37]. The PRG we construct is dense, but its input distribution is
not uniform. In contrast, [38, 37] constructs a PRG (on uniformly random inputs) from an arbitrary
one-way function, but the PRG is not necessarily dense.
11 NC0 may not be reasonable in the above sense, but the reduction we present in this section is correct.
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The property that enables our reduction is resamplability [26]. For now, think of “easy”
as being NC0-computable and “hard” as otherwise. A hard function f is resamplable, if given
an input x and random coins r, there is an easy procedure (the “resampler”) that produces
a uniform random input of f whose answer is the same as x.
▶ Example 11. The parity function PARITY(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn is hard (i.e., not
computable in NC0). Given n input bits x1, x2, . . . , xn and n−1 random bits r1, r2, . . . , rn−1,
we can produce a uniform random input whose answer is the same as x, as follows:
(x1 ⊕ r1, x2 ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2, x3 ⊕ r2 ⊕ r3, x4 ⊕ r3 ⊕ r4, . . . , xn−1 ⊕ rn−2 ⊕ rn−1, xn ⊕ rn−1).
Note that the resampler is easy (i.e., in NC0), thus parity is resamplable.
The reduction. We will use a ⊕L-complete problem named DCMD that is resamplable (see
Section 3.7). Our reduction is very simple: given an input x ∈ {0, 1}n, we choose a large
enough N = poly(n), and replace every bit xi by a random length-N instance of DCMD
whose answer is xi. Our reduction outputs the concatenation of these n instances.
Since DCMD is balanced (i.e., the number of 0-instances and 1-instances are the same),
our reduction maps a random instance to a random instance.
Now assume that ⊕L-Kt(x) = n− γ is non-trivial, and d is a ⊕L machine of description
length n− γ that “computes” x. Since DCMD is ⊕L-complete (under NC0-reductions), for
each i, the computation of xi can be reduced to a DCMD-instance si of length N such that
DCMD(si) = xi. Moreover, given the description d, we can produce s1 ◦ s2 ◦ · · · ◦ sn in NC0.
We use the resamplability of DCMD. The resampler for DCMD only uses N − 1 random
bits (which is optimal). Consider the following NC0 circuit. It receives d and r1, r2, . . . , rn
as inputs, where each ri is a random string of length N − 1. It computes s1, s2, . . . , sn
from d, and for each i, feeds si and ri to the resampler to obtain a uniform random
DCMD instance whose answer is the same as si. When ri are random bits, the output
distribution of this NC0 circuit is identical to the distribution of NC0-Kt instances we reduced
x to. Moreover, the NC0-Kt complexity of every string in this distribution is at most
(n− γ) + (N − 1)n + O(log n) = Nn− γ + O(log n), which is non-trivial.12
As a consequence, we also obtain an (average-case) reduction from ⊕L-Kt to KT.
2.3 Tighter Connections
To obtain a tight relationship between hardness of Kt and hardness of weak one-way functions,
we optimize the construction from one-way functions to PRGs in [62]. Suppose that given a
one-way function f with input length n, we could construct a PRG with output length m′.
Then solving Kt on length m′ is (roughly) as hard as inverting f on length n. Therefore, we
need m′ to be as close to n as possible. As the PRG is dense, its output length m′ is close to
its input length m, thus we only need m to be close to n.
It turns out that the input of the PRG consists of the input of f and the seeds of a few
pseudorandom objects.
One object is an extractor Ext(X , r) [70, 68], which given a “somewhat random” distribu-
tion X and a truly random seed r, outputs a distribution that is statistically close to the
uniform random distribution.
We use the near-optimal explicit extractors with O(log2 n) seed length [36].
12 The additive factor here is O(log n) since in our computational model, each memory access requires
Θ(log n) time. See Section 3.1 for details.
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Another object is a hardcore function HC(x, r) [32]. Let f be a one-way function, x be
a random input, and r be a random seed. Given f(x) ◦ r, it should be infeasible to
distinguish between HC(x, r) and a uniformly random string. Note that HC(x, r) needs
to have multiple output bits; in contrast, a hardcore predicate (also defined in [32]) only
has one output bit.
We use the observation, implicit in [82, 79], that any seed-extending “black-box” pseu-
dorandom generator is a good hardcore function. We use the direct product generator
[42, 41] as our hardcore function, which has O(log2 n) seed length, and very small “advice
complexity.” The advice complexity turns out to be related to the overhead of our
reduction.
There is another problem: [62] needs a strong one-way function to start with, but we only
have a weak one-way function. (A strong one-way function is infeasible to invert on almost
every input, but a weak one-way function is only infeasible to invert on a non-trivial fraction
of inputs.) Yao [92] showed how to “amplify” a weak one-way function to a strong one-way
function, but the overhead of this procedure is too large. In particular, Yao’s hardness
amplification does not preserve exponential hardness, and it is open whether exponentially-
hard weak one-way functions imply exponentially-hard strong one-way functions.
Our idea is to use Impagliazzo’s hardcore lemma [49] instead. The hardcore lemma states
that for any weak one-way function f , there is a “hardcore” distribution on which f becomes
a strong one-way function. We (and [62]; see Footnote 8) allow the input distribution of our
PRG to be arbitrary, as long as the output distribution is pseudorandom. Such “PRGs” still
imply hardness of Kt. The hardcore lemma has small complexity overhead, which allows us
to prove tight results.
Now, from a weak one-way function of input length n, we can construct a PRG with
output length n+O(log2 n). This construction allows us to transform the hardness of one-way
function to the hardness of Kt at almost no cost.
Tighter connections between MKTP and one-way functions in NC0. Here, the problem
becomes to construct NC0-computable PRGs from NC0-computable one-way functions. We
use a construction of universal hash functions in NC0 with linear seed length by Applebaum
[10]. Such hash functions are both good extractors (by the leftover hash lemma) and good
hardcore functions (proved in [15, 44]). As the hash functions require linear seed length, from
an NC0-computable one-way function with input length n, we obtain an NC0-computable
PRG with output length O(n). It follows that if the one-way function is hard against
2Ω(n)-size adversaries, then MKTP is also hard against 2Ω(n)-size algorithms.
2.4 MCSP-Related Results
One-way functions from hardness of MCSP. We use the straightforward construction:
our one-way function receives a circuit C, and outputs |C| and tt(C), where |C| is the size of
C and tt(C) is the truth table of C. The inverter, on input (s, tt), is required to find a size-s
circuit whose truth table is tt, thus needs to solve MCSP.
One problem with this construction is that if we sample a uniform circuit (according to
some distribution), the induced distribution over truth tables may not be uniform. In the
case of Kt (and KT), we can show that for every string of length n, its optimal description
is sampled (in the one-way function experiment) w.p. at least 2−n/poly(n), therefore we
can “transfer” the hardness of Kt over a random truth table to the hardness of inverting the
one-way function over a random description.
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Using the best bounds on the maximum circuit complexity of n-bit Boolean functions [28],
we can still prove that for every truth table of length N , its optimal circuit is sampled
w.p. at least 2−N /2η, where η < o(N). This means that starting from exponential hardness
of MCSP, we can still obtain non-trivial one-way functions.
We conjecture that hardness of MCSP actually implies one-way functions in NC0; see
Remark 76 for details.
Hardness of MCSP from one-way functions in NC0. To argue about the hardness of
MCSP, we need a PRG whose outputs have non-trivial circuit complexity. As before, we use
the hash functions in [10] to construct an exponentially-hard PRG. We would like to argue
that all outputs of the PRG have non-trivial circuit complexity. In order to do this, we use
the mass production theorem of Uhlig [83, 84] to generate a circuit of size (1 + o(1))2n/n
that evaluates a given function on multiple inputs. (If our PRG has locality d, i.e., each
output bit depends on d input bits, then we need a size-(1 + o(1))2n/n circuit that evaluates
d inputs in parallel.) However, Uhlig’s theorem only gives us non-trivial circuit size if our
PRG has linear stretch, i.e., stretch ϵn for some constant ϵ > 0. This is why we need the
hardness of the one-way function in our assumption to be at least poly(2ϵn).
2.5 Using Hardness of Kt to Capture Cryptographic and
Complexity-Theoretic Pseudorandomness
To show Theorem 4, we use ideas similar to those in Section 2.1.2. Suppose we try to define
a one-way function by computing the string corresponding to an optimal description with
respect to Kt complexity. An obvious issue is that such strings might require exponential
time to compute, while the one-way function needs to be evaluated efficiently. However,
we observe that typical inputs only require polynomial time to generate from their optimal
descriptions. Here, the typical inputs are those with Kolmogorov complexity n−O(log n).
In their optimal descriptions Kt(x) = |d|+ log t, we have t ≤ poly(n). Our one-way function
receives two inputs d, t, where d is the description of a machine, and t ≤ poly(n) is a time
bound. We simply simulate the machine d for t steps and output what it outputs. The
proof that this gives a one-way function is closely analogous to the proof of the reverse
implication in Theorem 1. The proof that one-way functions imply the average-case hardness
of Kt complexity mimics the proof of the corresponding implication in Theorem 2, since the
outputs of a cryptographic PRG with stretch λ log n have non-trivial Kt complexity when λ
is large enough compared to the time required to compute the PRG.
To show Theorem 5, we use the Nisan-Wigderson generator [69] in a way similar to how
it is used by [4] to show that Kt is complete for exponential time under polynomial-size
reductions. The interesting direction is to show that the Nisan-Wigderson generator implies
the average-case hardness of Kt for the range of parameters in the statement of Theorem 5.
We use the fact that the Nisan-Wigderson generator can be made seed-extending without
loss of generality. We truncate the output of the generator so that the stretch is (1 + ϵ)n for
some small ϵ > 0 – this implies that the outputs of the generator on all seeds have non-trivial
Kt complexity. Since the generator is seed-extending, the output has high entropy, hence
a strong enough average-case algorithm for Kt can distinguish random strings (which have
trivial Kt complexity) from the outputs of the PRG. Here we take advantage of the stretch
being small rather than large: this gives us better parameters for our average-case hardness
result.
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3 Preliminaries
We use Un to denote the uniform distribution over length-n binary strings. For a distribution
D, we use x ← D to denote that x is a random variable drawn from D. A function
negl : N → [0, 1] is negligible if for every constant c, negl(n) ≤ 1/nc for large enough
integers n.
Let D : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function, X and Y be two random variables over {0, 1}n.
For ϵ > 0, we say D ϵ-distinguishes X from Y if
|Pr[D(X) = 1]− Pr[D(Y ) = 1]| ≥ ϵ.
Otherwise we say X and Y are ϵ-indistinguishable by D.
We often consider ensemble of functions in this paper. For example, a function f : {0, 1}⋆
to {0, 1}⋆ can be interpreted as an ensemble f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}⋆}, and each fn is
the n-th slice of f . Similarly, we also consider ensemble of distributions D = {Dn} as input
distributions for a function f , where each Dn is a distribution over {0, 1}n.
3.1 Computational Model and Uniformity
We need a computational model with random access to inputs. We consider a Turing machine
that accesses the length-n input x via an “address” tape and a length-O(1) “answer” tape.
Whenever the machine enters a particular “address” state, let i be the binary number written
in the address tape. After one step, the content of the answer tape becomes xi, and the
address tape is cleared. (In other words, the Turing machine treats x as the truth table of
an oracle.)
We also assume that the address tape has length ⌈log n⌉. In particular, there are two
special markers at the address tape, and there are ⌈log n⌉ cells strictly between them. The
machine can only modify this portion of ⌈log n⌉ cells; the rest of the address tape is read-
only. For sub-linear time Turing machines, this can be viewed as a mechanism to provide
information about n (i.e., the length of x; up to a factor of 2). We also require that whenever
the machine enters the “address” state, all the ⌈log n⌉ cells between the two markers are
non-empty, so we can interpret the concatenation of these cells as a (binary) address.
Every bit operation takes one step. Therefore, it takes Θ(log n) time to write down an
address. Note that we clear the address tape after each access, which means when we access
another input bit, we have to spend another Θ(log n) time to write down the address from
scratch. This definition ensures that in O(log n) time we can only access a constant number
of input bits, so DLOGTIME becomes a natural uniform analogue of NC0.
In addition to the address tape and the answer tape, we also have a constant number of
work tapes. In the case that our Turing machine computes a multi-output function f , we
also provide an input tape that contains an index i (note that our real input is the “oracle”
x), which means our Turing machine outputs the i-th bit of f(x). We use Mx(i) to denote
the output of the machine M on input i, given oracle access to the string x. To measure the
space complexity of our Turing machine, we assume the input tape is read-only and we only
count the total length of work tapes.
▶ Definition 12. Let c > 0 be a constant, p(·) be a polynomial, and F = {Fn : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}p(n)} be an ensemble of functions. We say F ∈ TIME[c log n] if there is a Turing
machine M with running time c log n such that, for every x ∈ {0, 1}n and 1 ≤ i ≤ p(n),
Mx(n, i) outputs the i-th bit of Fn(x).
Let DLOGTIME =
⋃
c≥1 TIME[c log n].
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▶ Definition 13. Let c > 0 be a constant, p(·) be a polynomial, and F = {Fn : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}p(n)} be an ensemble of functions.
We say F is in ATIME[c log n], if there is an alternating Turing machine M of O(log n)
running time such that, for every x ∈ {0, 1}n, 1 ≤ i ≤ p(n), and b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, Mx(n, i, b) = 1
if the i-th bit of Fn(x) is b.
We say F is in SPACE[c log n], if there is a Turing machine M of space complexity c log n
that satisfies the above requirement. We say F is in uniform ⊕SPACE[c log n], if there is a
parity Turing machine M of space complexity c log n that satisfies the above requirement.
Let ALOGTIME = NC1 =
⋃
c≥1 ATIME[c log n]. (That is, in this paper, we use
ALOGTIME and NC1 interchangeably.) We also define L =
⋃




For the readers not familiar with parity Turing machines, we provide an alternative
definition of ⊕L by its complete problems; see Section 3.7.
3.2 Resource-Bounded Kolmogorov Complexity
We define some variants of resource-bounded Kolmogorov complexity. In particular, we define
the plain Kolmogorov complexity K, the KT complexity [4], the time-bounded Kolmogorov
complexity Kt [59], and Levin’s Kt complexity [60]. Then we define the NC1- and L-versions
of Kt.
▶ Definition 14. Let U be a Turing machine, x be a string. Artificially let x|x|+1 = ⋆.
KU (x) is the minimum |d| over the description d ∈ {0, 1}⋆, such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤
|x|+ 1 and b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, Ud(i, b) accepts if and only if xi = b.
KTU (x) is the minimum value of |d|+ t over the pairs (d, t), such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤
|x|+ 1 and b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, Ud(i, b) accepts in t steps if and only if xi = b.
KtU (x) is the minimum value of |d| + log t over the pairs (d, t), such that for every
1 ≤ i ≤ |x|+ 1 and b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, Ud(i, b) accepts in t steps if and only if xi = b.
Let t : N→ N be a resource bound. KtU (x) is the minimum value of |d| such that for every
1 ≤ i ≤ |x|+ 1 and b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, Ud(i, b) accepts in t(|x|) steps if and only if xi = b.
▶ Definition 15. Let Ua be an alternating Turing machine, and Us be a (space-bounded)
Turing machine. Let x be a string and artificially let x|x|+1 = ⋆.
Let t : N→ N be a resource bound. NC1-KtUa(x) is the minimum value of |d| such that
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |x|+ 1 and b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, Uda (i, b) accepts in alternating time log t(|x|) if
and only if xi = b.
Let t : N→ N be a resource bound. L-KtUs(x) is the minimum value of |d| such that for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ |x|+ 1 and b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, Uds (i, b) accepts in space log t(|x|) if and only if
xi = b.
Our results hold for every efficient enough universal Turing machine U . Therefore, in
this paper, we drop the subscript U and simply write KT, Kt, etc.
We also define the circuit complexity of a truth table:
▶ Definition 16. Let N = 2n, tt ∈ {0, 1}N be a truth table that corresponds to a function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. We define Size(tt) as the size (number of gates) of the smallest circuit
that computes f .
Given a complexity measure µ, the Minimum µ Problem is the language {(x, 1k) : µ(x) ≤
k}. In particular:
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▶ Definition 17. We define the following problems:
(Minimum KT Problem) MKTP := {(x, 1k) : KT(x) ≤ k}.
(Minimum Time-Bounded Kolmogorov Complexity Problem) MINKT := {(x, 1t, 1s) :
Kt(x) ≤ s}.
(Minimum Circuit Size Problem) MCSP := {(tt, 1s) : Size(tt) ≤ s}.
There are natural search versions for the problems above. The search version for MKTP
is to find an optimal description d for x, such that x can be generated from d implicitly in
time at most k − |d|. The search version for MINKT is to find an optimal description d of
size at most s for x such that x can be generated from d in time at most t. The search
version for MCSP is to find a circuit of size at most s for the Boolean function whose truth
table is tt.
We need a “trivial” upper bound on these complexity measures. We only state the upper
bound for KT complexity.
▶ Fact 18 ([4, Proposition 13]). There is an absolute constant c′ > 0 such that KT(x) ≤
|x|+ c′ log |x| for every string x.
We need the fact that most strings have large Kolmogorov complexity.
▶ Fact 19. Let n be an integer, s ≤ n− 1, then
Pr
x←Un
[K(x) ≤ s] ≤ 2−(n−s−1).
Proof Sketch. The number of strings x such that K(x) ≤ s is at most
∑s
i=0 2i = 2s+1−1. ◀
3.3 Basic Information Theory
We also need some basic concepts in information theory. The Shannon entropy of a random
variable X, denoted as H(X), is defined as
H(X) := E
x←X
[− log Pr[X = x]].
The min-entropy of a random variable X, denoted as H∞(X), is the largest real number
k such that for every x in the support of X,
Pr[X = x] ≤ 2−k.
Let X, Y be two random variables defined over a set S. The statistical distance between
X and Y , denoted as SD(X, Y ), is defined as
SD(X, Y ) := 12
∑
s∈S
|Pr[X = s]− Pr[Y = s]|.
An equivalent definition is as follows: SD(X, Y ) is the maximum value of ϵ such that there is
a (possibly unbounded) distinguisher D that ϵ-distinguishes X from Y :
SD(X, Y ) := max
D:S→{0,1}
|Pr[D(X) = 1]− Pr[D(Y ) = 1]|.
H. Ren and R. Santhanam 35:17
3.4 Bounded-Error Average-Case Hardness
We define the (bounded-error) average-case hardness of a function f . (Think of f = KT or
Kt.) In the cryptographic setting, we require that any algorithm with an arbitrary polynomial
run time fails to solve a fixed-polynomial fraction of inputs.
▶ Definition 20. Let f : {0, 1}⋆ → N be a function.
We say that f is (bounded-error) hard on average if the following is true. There is a




[A(x) = f(x)] ≤ 1− 1
nc
.
Let d be a constant. We say that f is (bounded-error) hard on average to (d log n)-
approximate if the following is true. There is a constant c > 0 such that for every PPT
machine A and every large enough input length n,
Pr
x←Un




We recall the standard definition of one-way functions and weak one-way functions.
▶ Definition 21 (One-Way Functions). Let f : {0, 1}⋆ → {0, 1}⋆ be a polynomial-time
computable function. We say f is a one-way function if for every PPT adversary A, it
inverts a random output of f with negligible probability. That is, for every n ∈ N,
Pr
x←Un
[A(f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))] ≤ negl(n).
One-way functions are also called strong one-way functions, as no PPT adversary could
invert it non-trivially. We also consider weak one-way functions, where no PPT adversary
could invert it on a 1− negl(n) fraction of inputs.
▶ Definition 22 (Weak One-Way Functions). Let f : {0, 1}⋆ → {0, 1}⋆ be a polynomial-time
computable function. We say f is a weak one-way function if there is a polynomial p(·) such
that the following holds. For every PPT adversary A, it inverts a random output of f with
probability at most 1− 1/p(n). That is, for every n ∈ N,
Pr
x←Un
[A(f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))] ≤ 1− 1
p(n) .
By a standard padding trick (see e.g., [30]), we can assume that (weak or strong) one-way
functions are length-preserving, i.e. for every input x ∈ {0, 1}⋆, |f(x)| = |x|. In this paper,
we will implicitly assume that every one-way function is length-preserving.
Yao showed that every weak one-way function can be amplified into a strong one-way
function.
▶ Theorem 23 ([92, 30]). If there exists a weak one-way function, then there exists a strong
one-way function.
In particular, let f be a weak one-way function. Then there is a polynomial k(·), such
that the following function fk is a strong one-way function.
fk(x1, x2, . . . , xk(n)) = f(x1) ◦ f(x2) ◦ · · · ◦ f(xk(n)),
where x1, x2, . . . , xk(n) are length-n inputs.
13 PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial-time.
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3.6 Conditionally Secure Entropy-Preserving PRGs
Here we define conditionally secure entropy-preserving PRGs (condEP-PRGs), introduced
in [62].
A pseudorandom generator, according to the standard definition, is a polynomial-time
computable function G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m (where m > n), such that G(Un) and Um
are computationally indistinguishable. Compared with standard PRGs, a condEP-PRG
G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m has three differences:
The input distribution of G is not Un. Instead, it is the uniform distribution over a subset
of inputs En, called the condition. (We will use En to denote both the subset and the
uniform distribution over this subset.)
G is entropy-preserving, meaning that G(En) has large (information-theoretic) entropy.
(Note that log |En| ≤ n ≤ m. As a consequence, log |En| cannot be too small compared to
m.)
Finally, G only (1/p(n))-fools PPT adversaries for a fixed polynomial p(·). For comparison,
a standard PRG is required to (1/p(n))-fool PPT adversaries for every polynomial p(·).
This difference is mostly technical.
▶ Definition 24 (Conditionally Secure Entropy-Preserving PRG, abbr. condEP-PRG, [62]). Let
γ > 0 be a constant, and p(·) be a polynomial. Consider a polynomial-time computable
ensemble of functions G = {Gn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n+γ log n}. We say G is a condEP-PRG, if
there is a family of subsets E = {En ⊆ {0, 1}n} (called the “events” or “conditions”), such
that the following are true.
1. (Pseudorandomness) Gn(En) is (1/p(n))-indistinguishable from Un+γ log n by PPT ad-
versaries. That is, for every PPT A and every integer n,∣∣∣∣ Prx←Un+γ log n[A(x) = 1]− Prx←Gn(En)[A(x) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < 1/p(n).
2. (Entropy-Preservation) There is a constant d such that for every large enough n,
H(Gn(En)) ≥ n− d log n.
We say the stretch of G is γ log n, and the security of G is 1/p(n).
▶ Theorem 25 ([62]). There is a function EP-PRG computable in ALOGTIME, such that the
following holds. For any one-way function f : {0, 1}⋆ → {0, 1}⋆ and any constant γ > 0, let
G(x, z) = EP-PRG(γ, x, f(x), z), then G is a condEP-PRG with stretch γ log n and security
1/nγ .
▶ Remark 26. It is important that the machine EP-PRG is fixed and does not depend on the
constant γ. Suppose there is an absolute constant c > 0 such that for every γ > 0, there is a
PRG Gγ that runs in TIME[c log n] and stretches n bits into n + γ log n bits. The outputs of
Gγ will always have KT complexity at most n+ c log n+O(1) < n+γ log n, hence a heuristic
for MKTP can always distinguish the outputs of Gγ from truly random strings. It follows
that we can use such Gγ to argue about the hardness of MKTP. On the other hand, if the
time complexity of Gγ depends on γ, it does not necessarily imply any hardness of MKTP.
3.7 Complete Problems for ⊕L
We introduce the ⊕L-complete problems, called Connected Matrix Determinant (CMD) and
Decomposed Connected Matrix Determinant (DCMD), that will be crucial to us. Originally
motivated by secure multi-party computation [54, 55], these problems have found surprisingly
many applications in cryptography and complexity theory [11, 33, 26, 43, 23].
Let n be any integer, define ℓCMD(n) := n(n + 1)/2 and ℓDCMD(n) := n3(n + 1)/2.
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▶ Definition 27 (See e.g., [23]). An instance of CMD is an n× n matrix over GF(2) where
the main diagonal and above may contain either 0 or 1, the second diagonal (i.e., the one
below the main diagonal) contains 1, and other entries are 0. In other words, the matrix is
of the following form (where ∗ represents any element in GF(2)):
∗ ∗ ∗ · · · ∗ ∗
1 ∗ ∗ · · · ∗ ∗
0 1 ∗ · · · ∗ ∗







0 0 0 · · · 1 ∗

.
The instance is an (n(n + 1)/2)-bit string specifying elements on and above the main diagonal.
We define x ∈ CMD if and only if the determinant (over GF(2)) of the matrix corresponding
to x is 1.
An instance of DCMD is a string of length n3(n + 1)/2. For an input x, DCMD(x) is
computed as follows: we partition x into blocks of length n2, let yi(1 ≤ i ≤ n(n + 1)/2) be
the parity of the i-th block, and define DCMD(x) := CMD(y1 ◦ y2 ◦ · · · ◦ yn(n+1)/2).
The precise definitions of CMD and DCMD are not important here, but we need the
following important facts about them.
▶ Theorem 28 ([11]). Let n be an integer. There is a function PCMD : {0, 1}ℓCMD(n) ×
{0, 1}ℓDCMD(n)−1 → {0, 1}ℓDCMD(n), computable in DLOGTIME, such that the following hold.
For any input x ∈ {0, 1}ℓCMD(n), the distribution of PCMD(x,UℓDCMD(n)−1) is equal to the
uniform distribution over {y : y ∈ {0, 1}ℓDCMD(n) : DCMD(y) = CMD(x)}.
Note that PCMD only uses ℓDCMD(n)− 1 random bits, which is optimal. It also implies:
▶ Corollary 29. DCMD is balanced. In other words, for every integer n, the number of Yes
instances and No instances of DCMD on input length ℓDCMD(n) are the same.
Proof. Fix any Yes instance x ∈ {0, 1}n of CMD, then {PCMD(x, r) : r ∈ {0, 1}ℓDCMD(n)−1}
contains every Yes instance of DCMD. It follows that there are at most 2ℓDCMD(n)−1 Yes
instances of DCMD on input length ℓDCMD(n). The same upper bound can also be obtained
for No instances. Since there are 2ℓDCMD(n) strings of length ℓDCMD(n), there must be exactly
2ℓDCMD(n)−1 Yes instances and exactly 2ℓDCMD(n)−1 No instances of length ℓDCMD(n). ◀
▶ Theorem 30 ([54, 55]). CMD is ⊕L-complete under projections.14
In other words, a language L is in ⊕L if and only if there is a polynomial t(·) and a
DLOGTIME-computable projection p : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓCMD(t(n)), such that for every input
x ∈ {0, 1}n, x ∈ L if and only if CMD(p(x)) = 1.
▶ Remark 31. A proof of Theorem 30 can be found in [23, Section B.1]. However, the
proof in [23] does not show that the projections are DLOGTIME-uniform. In particular,
the reduction needs to calculate the topological order of the underlying (parity) branching
program (σ1, σ2, . . . , σm in [23, Section B.1]), which may not be computable in DLOGTIME.
14 A projection is a (multi-output) function where each output bit either is a constant, or only depends on
one input bit.
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We can fix this issue by adding a clock to the log-space Turing machine; a state of
the Turing machine appears earlier in the topological order if its clock value is smaller.
Equivalently, let G = (V, E) be the old branching program. The new branching program
Gnew has a vertex (i, v) for every 0 ≤ i ≤ |V | and v ∈ V , and has edges from (i, u) to (i + 1, v)
for every edge (u, v) ∈ G and every 0 ≤ i < |V |. Let V = {v1, . . . , vn}, then
(0, v1), . . . , (0, vn), (1, v1), . . . , (1, vn), . . . , (|V |, v1), . . . , (|V |, vn)
is a valid topological ordering of Gnew. Now we can use [23, Section B.1] to reduce the
computation of Gnew to CMD by a DLOGTIME-uniform projection.
We would like to thank Yanyi Liu for pointing out this issue.
Theorem 28 and 30 implies the following beautiful result in [11].
▶ Theorem 32 ([11]). Suppose there is a one-way function computable in ⊕L. Then there is
a one-way function computable in DLOGTIME.
Proof Sketch. Let f be a one-way function in ⊕L. There is a DLOGTIME-computable
function p(·, i) that maps n input bits to poly(n) output bits, such that for every integer
i and every string x, the i-th output bit of f(x) is CMD(p(x, i)). Consider the following
function:
g(x, y, i) := PCMD(p(x, i), y).
It turns out that the function g(x, y) = g(x, y, 1) ◦ · · · ◦ g(x, y, n) is still one-way. ◀
4 KT Complexity and Parallel Cryptography
In this section, we characterize the existence of one-way functions in DLOGTIME by the
average-case hardness of MKTP. Recall that the seminal work of [11] showed that the
existence of one-way functions in DLOGTIME is also equivalent to the existence of one-way
functions in uniform NC1, L, or ⊕L.
▶ Theorem 1 (Main Result; Informal). There is a one-way function computable in uniform
NC1 if and only if KT is bounded-error hard on average.
4.1 One-Way Functions in NC0 from Hardness of MKTP
▶ Theorem 33. Suppose that the search version of KT is bounded-error hard on average.
Then there is a one-way function computable in DLOGTIME.
Proof. We show that there is a weak one-way function computable in logarithmic space.
Then by Theorem 23, there is a one-way function in logarithmic space, and by Theorem 32,
there is a one-way function in DLOGTIME.
Suppose KT is bounded-error hard on average. By Definition 20, there is a constant
c > 0 such that for every PPT algorithm A and every large enough n, the probability that
A solves the search version of KT on a random length-n input is at most 1− 1/nc.
For a string x, we define t(x) to be the parameter t in the definition of KT(x) (Defini-
tion 14). Formally, t(x) is the smallest integer t such that there is a description d of length
KT(x)− t, such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |x| and b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, Ud(i, b) accepts in t steps if and
only if xi = b. We can see that most strings have small t(x). In what follows, let c1 be the
absolute constant in Fact 18, such that for every x ∈ {0, 1}n, KT(x) ≤ |x|+ c1 log |x|.
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▷ Claim 34. For all but an 1/nc+1 fraction of strings x ∈ {0, 1}n, we have t(x) ≤
(c + c1 + 2) log n.
Proof of Claim 34. By Fact 18, for every x ∈ {0, 1}n, KT(x) ≤ n + c1 log n. By Fact 19, all
but a 1/nc+1 fraction of strings x ∈ {0, 1}n satisfies that K(x) > n− (c + 1) log n− 1. For
such strings x, we have t(x) ≤ KT(x)−K(x) ≤ (c + c1 + 2) log n. ◁
For convenience, we say a pair (d, t) outputs the string x, if (d, t) is a valid “witness” for
KT(x), i.e. for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |x|+ 1 and b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, Ud(i, b) accepts in time t if and only if
xi = b. Let Output(d, t) be the (unique) string that (d, t) outputs; if (d, t) does not output
any (finite) string, let Output(d, t) = ⊥.
We define a weak one-way function f as follows.
Algorithm 1 Weak OWF in L from Average-Case Hardness of MKTP.
1: function f(ℓ, t, M)
2: The input consists of integers ℓ ∈ [n + c1 log n], t ∈ [(c + c1 + 2) log n], and a string
M ∈ {0, 1}n+c1 log n.
3: M ′ ← the first ℓ bits of M
4: out← Output(M ′, t)
5: if |out| = n then
6: return the concatenation of ℓ, t, and out
7: else
8: return ⊥
Since t ≤ O(log n), we can always compute Output(M ′, t) in logarithmic space. It follows
that f is computable in logarithmic space.
Let Dowf be the output distribution of f on uniform inputs. In other words, to sample
from Dowf , we sample two integers ℓ ← [n + c1 log n], t ← [(c + c1 + 2) log n] and a string
M of length n + c1 log n, and output f(ℓ, t, M). We prove that Dowf almost dominates the
uniform distribution over {0, 1}n, in the following sense.
▷ Claim 35. Let n be a large enough integer. For every string x such that t(x) ≤ (c + c1 +
2) log n, the probability that a random sample from Dowf is equal to (KT(x)− t(x), t(x), x)
is at least 12nn2+c1 .
Proof of Claim 35. For a large enough n, with probability at least 1n2 , the sampler for Dowf
samples t = t(x) and ℓ = KT(x) − t(x). Then, with probability 12ℓ ≥
1
2nnc1 , the sampler
samples a description M ′ such that Output(M ′, t) = x. It follows that w.p. at least 12nn2+c1
the sampler outputs (KT(x)− t(x), t(x), x). ◁
Now, we can prove the security of the weak OWF f . Let Aowf be a candidate PPT
adversary trying to invert f . We construct a polynomial-time algorithm AKT that attempts
to solve (the search version of) MKTP as in Algorithm 2.
Note that for a fixed input x, AKT(x) fails to output a valid witness for KT(x) only if
Aowf fails to invert the output (KT(x)− t(x), t(x), x). Let pfail(x) be the probability (over










Let p be the probability that Aowf fails to invert a random input of f . Then
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Algorithm 2 Bounded-Error Heuristic AKT for MKTP from Inverter Aowf for f .
1: function AKT(x)
2: n← |x|; Opt← +∞; Witness← ⊥
3: for ℓ ∈ [n + c1 log n] and t ∈ [(c + c1) log n] do
4: (ℓ′, t′, M)← Aowf(ℓ, t, x)
5: M ′ ← the first ℓ′ bits of M
6: if Output(M ′, t′) = x and Opt > |M ′|+ t′ then
7: Opt← |M ′|+ t′
8: Witness← (M ′, t′)



































Let c′ = c + c1 + 4, then every PPT adversary Aowf fails to invert a random input of f
w.p. at least 1
nc′
. It follows that f is a weak OWF. ◀
4.2 Hardness of MKTP from One-Way Functions in ⊕L
In this section, we prove the following theorem.
▶ Theorem 36. Suppose there is a one-way function computable in ⊕L. Then for every
constant λ > 0, KT is bounded-error hard on average to approximate within an additive
factor of λ log n.
Let f be a one-way function in ⊕L. The proof consists of three steps:
First, we use f to build a condEP-PRG G. If f is computable in ⊕L, then G is also
computable in ⊕L. This step is the same as in [62], and follows directly from Theorem 25.
Second, we construct the randomized encoding G̃ of G. We argue that G̃ is also a
condEP-PRG. Moreover, G̃ is computable in DLOGTIME. This step is implemented in
Lemma 37.
Last, as every output of G̃ has small KT complexity, we use the security of G̃ to show
that MKTP is bounded-error hard on average. This step is implemented in Lemma 39.
4.2.1 CondEP-PRG in DLOGTIME
In this section, we prove the following lemma that constructs a DLOGTIME-computable
condEP-PRG from a ⊕L-computable condEP-PRG.
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▶ Lemma 37. Suppose there is a constant c > 0 such that for every constant λ > 0, there is a
condEP-PRG G with stretch λ log n and security 1/nλ that is computable in ⊕SPACE[c log n].
Then there is a constant c′ > 0 such that for every constant λ > 0, there is a condEP-PRG
G̃ with stretch λ log n and security 1/nλ that is computable in TIME[c′ log n].
Proof. Fix an input length n. Let λ′ be a constant that depends on λ, we will fix λ′ later.
Let G be a condEP-PRG with stretch λ′ log n and security 1/nλ′ that is computable in
⊕SPACE[c log n]. We denote the n-th slice of G as Gn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ, where ℓ :=
n + λ′ log n.
Let N := nc. Since G ∈ ⊕SPACE[log N ], there are projections
Gproj1 , G
proj
2 , . . . , G
proj
ℓ : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}ℓCMD(N),
such that the i-th output bit of G(x) is equal to CMD(Gproji (x)). Let r1, r2, . . . , rℓ be random
strings of length ℓDCMD(N)− 1. Let PCMD be the DLOGTIME-computable function defined
in Theorem 28, then the i-th output bit of G(x) is equal to DCMD(PCMD(Gproji (x), ri)). We
define
G̃(x, r1, . . . , rℓ) = PCMD(Gproj1 (x), r1) ◦ PCMD(G
proj
2 (x), r2) ◦ · · · ◦ PCMD(G
proj
ℓ (x), rℓ).
(G̃ is the “randomized encoding” of G in the sense of [11].)
It is easy to see that there is a constant cg depending only on c, such that G̃ ∈
TIME[cg log n]. Note that the input length of G̃ is nin := n + ℓ · (ℓDCMD(N) − 1), the
output length of G̃ is nout := ℓ · ℓDCMD(N), and nout = nin + (ℓ− n) = nin + λ′ log n. Here,
we fix λ′ large enough such that λ′ ≥ λ log ninlog n .
▷ Claim 38. G̃ is a condEP-PRG with stretch λ log nin and security 1/(nin)λ.
Proof. Clearly, the stretch of G̃ is λ′ log n ≥ λ log nin.
Suppose E = {En ⊆ {0, 1}n} is a sequence of events such that G and E satisfy Definition 24.
Let Ẽ := {Ẽnin} where Ẽnin := En × {0, 1}ℓ·(ℓDCMD(N)−1). We verify that G̃ and Ẽ satisfy
Definition 24.
Pseudorandomness. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is a PPT adversary
A′ such that
Pr[A′(G̃(Ẽnin))]− Pr[A′(Unout)] ≥ 1/(nin)λ.
Consider an adversary A that distinguishes G(En) from Uℓ as follows. On input y, for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, let ri be a uniformly random length-ℓDCMD(N) input of DCMD such that
DCMD(ri) = yi. We concatenate them as r = r1 ◦ r2 ◦ · · · ◦ rℓ, and let A(y) = A′(r).
Suppose y ← G(En), then the distribution of r is exactly G̃(Ẽnin). On the other hand,
suppose y ∼ Uℓ, then the distribution of r is exactly Unout . As A′ distinguishes G̃(Ẽnin) from
Unout with advantage ≥ 1/(nin)λ, we can see that A also distinguishes G(En) from Uℓ with
advantage ≥ 1/(nin)λ ≥ 1/nλ
′ , contradicting the security of G.
Entropy-preservation. Consider the above experiment, where we first sample y← G(En),
then sample a uniform string ri of length ℓDCMD(N) such that DCMD(ri) = yi for every
1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, and finally concatenate them as r = r1 ◦ r2 ◦ · · · ◦ rℓ. The distribution of r is
exactly G̃(Ẽnin). Therefore,
H(G̃(Ẽnin)) = H(G(En)) + ℓ · (ℓDCMD(N)− 1)
≥ n− Ω(log n) + ℓ · (ℓDCMD(N)− 1)
≥ nin − Ω(log nin). ◁
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We have only defined G̃ and Ẽ on input lengths of the form
nin(n) = n + (n + λ′ log n)(ℓDCMD(nc) + 1).
However, it is straightforward to define G̃ and Ẽ on every input length. Let m be an input
length, m′ = nin(n) be the largest number of the form nin(n) such that m′ ≤ m. On input
x ∈ {0, 1}m, let x1 be the length-m′ prefix of x and x2 be the rest of x (i.e., x = x1 ◦ x2),
and we can define G̃(x) = G̃(x1) ◦ x2. Similarly, we could define Ẽm = Ẽm′ ×{0, 1}m−m
′ . ◀
4.2.2 Hardness of MKTP
▶ Lemma 39. Suppose there is a constant c > 0 such that for every constant λ > 0, there is
a condEP-PRG G with stretch λ log n and security 1/nλ that is computable in TIME[c log n].
Then for every constant λ > 0, KT is bounded-error hard on average to approximate
within an additive error of λ log n.
Proof. Let λ′ := λ + c1 + 2 for a constant c1 defined later, and G be a condEP-PRG with
stretch λ′ log n and security 1/nλ′ that is computable in TIME[c log n]. Fix an input length
n, and let ℓ := n + λ′ log n.
We note that the KT complexity of every output of G is nontrivial. Let c1 be a large
enough constant that only depends on c. Since G ∈ TIME[c log n], there is a description d of
constant length such that the following holds: For every input x ∈ {0, 1}n, every 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ+1,
and every b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, Ud,x(i, b) accepts in (c1 − 1) log n time if and only if the i-th bit of
G(x) is equal to b. It follows that for every x ∈ {0, 1}n,
KT(G(x)) ≤ n + (c1 − 1) log n + O(1) < ℓ− (λ′ − c1) log n.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that KT is bounded-error easy on average to
approximate, within an additive factor of λ log n. For a large constant ckt that we fix later,
there is a PPT machine A such that
Pr
y←Uℓ
[KT(y) ≤ A(y) ≤ KT(y) + λ log n] ≥ 1− 1
nckt
. (2)
It is natural to consider the following adversary A′: On input y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, A′ outputs
1 if A(y) ≥ ℓ− 2 log n, and outputs 0 otherwise. We will prove the following two lemmas,
showing that A′ distinguishes G(En) from Uℓ with good advantage.
▶ Lemma 40. Pry←Uℓ [A′(y) = 1] ≥ 1− 1n2 −
1
nckt .
Proof. By Fact 19, all but a 1n2 fraction of strings y ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ satisfies that K(y) ≥ ℓ− 2 log n.






fraction of strings y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, we have A(y) ≥ KT(y) ≥
K(y) ≥ ℓ− 2 log n. On these strings y we have A′(y) = 1. ◁
▶ Lemma 41. Pry←G(En)[A′(y) = 1] ≤ 1− 1n .
Proof. Let H := H(G(En)). Let d be the constant such that ℓ−H ≤ d log n. The constant d
does not depend on ckt, which means we can set ckt := d + 15.
Consider the set of outputs of G that is outputted with probability at most 21−H . We
say these inputs are good. Let Good be the set of good inputs, i.e.,
Good :=
{
y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ : 0 < Pr[G(En) = y] ≤ 21−H
}
.
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We can see that there are many good strings. Actually, let p := Pry←G(En)[y ∈ Good],
then
H = H(G(En)) ≤ p · n + (1− p) · (H − 1),
which implies that p ≥ 1n−H+1 .
Let Err be the subset of Good on which A fails to produce a good approximation of KT.
(In case that A is a randomized algorithm, it fails w.p. at least 1/n4.) That is,
Err :=
{
y ∈ Good : Pr[KT(y) ≤ A(y) ≤ KT(y) + λ log n] ≤ 1− 1/n4
}
.
By Equation (2), |Err| ≤ 2ℓ/nckt−4. Therefore,
Pr
y←G(En)
[y ∈ Err] ≤ (2ℓ/nckt−4) · 21−H ≤ 2 · nd+4−ckt ≤ 1/n4.
Note that for every y in the range of G(En), if A is correct on y, we have A(y) <
ℓ− (λ′−c1) log n+λ log n = ℓ−2 log n. Therefore for every y ∈ Good\Err, we have A′(y) = 0
w.p. at least 1− 1/n4 over the internal randomness of A′. It follows that
Pr
y←G(En)
[A′(y) = 1] ≤ (1− p) + Pr
y←G(En)
[y ∈ Err] + 1
n4
≤ 1− 1








From the pseudorandomness of the condEP-PRG G, we conclude that KT is hard on
average to approximate within an additive error of λ log n.
Note that we have only proved the hardness of MKTP on input lengths of the form
n+λ′ log n, but it is straightforward to extend the argument to every input length m. Let m′
be the largest number of the form m′ = n + λ′ log n such that m′ ≤ m, then m−m′ ≤ O(1).
For every x ∈ {0, 1}m, let x1 be the length-m′ prefix of x. There is an absolute constant
d such that KT(x1) − d log m ≤ KT(x) ≤ KT(x1) + d log m. It follows that if we can
approximate MKTP on input length m′, then we can also approximate MKTP on input
length m. ◀
4.2.3 Proof of Theorem 36
▶ Theorem 36. Suppose there is a one-way function computable in ⊕L. Then for every
constant λ > 0, KT is bounded-error hard on average to approximate within an additive
factor of λ log n.
Proof. Let c be a constant such that there is a one-way function f computable in
⊕SPACE[c log n]. Let EP-PRG be the Turing machine guaranteed in Theorem 25. For
every constant λ > 0, let G(x, z) = EP-PRG(λ, x, f(x), z). Then there is a constant c1 only
depending on c (not on λ) such that G is computable in ⊕SPACE[c1 log n]. Moreover, G is a
condEP-PRG with stretch λ log n and security 1/nλ.
By Lemma 37, there is a constant c2 only depending on c such that for every constant
λ > 0, there is a condEP-PRG with stretch λ log n and security 1/nλ that is computable
in TIME[c2 log n]. By Lemma 39, for every constant λ > 0, KT is bounded-error hard on
average to approximate within an additive error of λ log n. ◀
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4.3 Bounded-Error Average-Case Robustness of Meta-Complexity
Our techniques also show that the meta-complexity of (resource-bounded) Kolmogorov
complexity is “robust”, i.e. a slight change in the underlying computation model has little effect
on their hardness. Actually, for many resource-bounded variants of Kolmogorov complexity,
such as KT, NC1-Kt, and L-Kt, either all of them admit bounded-error polynomial-time
heuristics, or none of them do. (See Section 3.2 for their definition.)
▶ Theorem 42. The following are equivalent:
1. There is a one-way function computable in ⊕L.
2. There is a one-way function computable in DLOGTIME.
3. The search version of KT is hard on average.
4. For every constant λ > 0, KT is hard on average to approximate within an additive error
of λ log n.
5. There is a polynomial t(·) such that the search version of NC1-Kt is hard on average.
6. For every constant λ > 0 and polynomial t(·) such that t(n) > 2n, NC1-Kt is hard on
average to approximate within an additive error of λ log n.
7. There is a polynomial t(·) such that the search version of L-Kt is hard on average.
8. For every constant λ > 0 and polynomial t(·) such that t(n) > 2n, L-Kt is hard on average
to approximate within an additive error of λ log n.
Proof Sketch. (2) =⇒ (1), (4) =⇒ (3), (6) =⇒ (5), and (8) =⇒ (7) are trivial.
(3) =⇒ (2): Directly from Theorem 33.
(5) =⇒ (2) and (7) =⇒ (2): The construction from [62, Section 4] gives a one-way
function computable in ALOGTIME (i.e., uniform NC1), based on the hardness of NC1-Kt.
By Theorem 32, there is a one-way function computable in DLOGTIME. The same argument
works for L-Kt.
(1) =⇒ (4): Directly from Theorem 36.
(1) =⇒ (6): Consider the condEP-PRG G computable in TIME[c log n] that we
constructed in the proof of Theorem 36, where c is some constant. Let t′(n) := nO(c), for
every x ∈ {0, 1}n that in the range of G, NC1-Kt′(x) ≤ n−Θ(log n). It follows that there is
a polynomial t′ such that NC1-Kt′ is hard on average to approximate.
To prove that NC1-Kt is hard on average to approximate for every polynomial t, we
use a padding trick. (See also [62, Theorem 5.6].) Let ϵ > 0 be a small enough constant,
and n1 = nϵ. Consider the generator G′(x, r) = G(x) ◦ r, where |x| = n1 and |r| = n− n1.
It is easy to see that if G is a condEP-PRG, then G′ is also a condEP-PRG. For every
x ∈ {0, 1}n that is in the range of G′, if we take ϵ to be a small enough constant, we
have NC1-Kt(x) ≤ n−Θ(log n). Since G′ is pseudorandom, NC1-Kt is hard on average to
approximate.
(1) =⇒ (8): The same argument as in (1) =⇒ (6) also works for L-Kt. ◀
4.4 Zero-Error Average-Case Reductions
Our techniques actually imply reductions among MKTP, NC1-MINKT, and L-MINKT. A
closer look at these reductions reveals that they are not only two-sided error average-case
reductions, but also zero-error ones! This allows us to prove new relations between the
zero-error average-case complexity of variants of MINKT and MKTP.
The standard definition of an average-case complexity class, such as AvgZPP, is a class of
pairs (L,D) where L is a language, and D is a distribution ensemble over inputs. (See, e.g.,
[12, Chapter 18].) In this section, we only deal with the uniform distribution as the input
distribution. Therefore, for simplicity, we define AvgZPP as a class of languages rather than
(language, distribution) pairs.
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▶ Definition 43. Let L be a language and δ > 0 be a constant. We say L ∈ AvgδZPP
if there is a zero-error PPT heuristic H, such that the following are true: (To emphasize
that H is a randomized heuristic, we use H(x; r) to denote the output of H on input x and
randomness r.)
For every input x ∈ {0, 1}⋆ and r ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|), H(x; r) ∈ {L(x),⊥}.




We consider the parameterized versions of MKTP and MINKT in this section. Let
t(n) ≤ poly(n) be a time bound, and s(n) ≤ n be a size parameter. We define MKTP[s] =
{x : KT(x) ≤ s(|x|)}, and MINKt[s] = {x : Kt(|x|)(x) ≤ s(|x|)}. The problems NC1-MINKt[s]
and L-MINKt[s] are defined similarly.
A language L is sparse if for every integer n, Prx←Un [x ∈ L] ≤ o(1). From Fact 19, for
every unbounded function f(n) = ω(1), MKTP[n − f(n)] and MINKpoly(n)[n − f(n)] are
sparse. In general, to solve a sparse problem L on average, it suffices to design a heuristic
that distinguishes every instance in L from the random instances. Therefore, the following
notion of reductions will be convenient for studying the zero-error average-case complexity of
sparse problems:
▶ Definition 44. Let L1, L2 be two problems. We say there is a one-sided mapping reduction
from L1 to L2, if there are polynomials p(·), m(·), and a randomized polynomial-time mapping
Red : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}p(n) → {0, 1}m(n), such that the following holds.
For every x ∈ L1 ∩ {0, 1}n and r ∈ {0, 1}p(n), it holds that Red(x; r) ∈ L2.
The distribution of Red(Un;Up(n)) is equal to Um(n).
▶ Remark 45. Here we require that the reduction maps the uniform distribution to the
uniform distribution exactly. In some cases, this requirement is too strong, and we only need
that Um(n) dominates Red(Un;Up(n)). (See [12, Definition 18.6].) Nevertheless, thanks to the
perfect randomized encodings [11], we are able to design reductions as strong as Definition 44.
In short, a one-sided mapping reduction (among sparse problems) maps a Yes instance to
a Yes instance, and maps a random instance to a random instance. It is easy to see that
such reductions preserve the property of being in AvgΩ(1)ZPP.
▶ Fact 46. Let L1, L2 be two sparse problems. Suppose that there is a one-sided mapping
reduction Red from L1 to L2. If there is a constant δ2 > 0 such that L2 ∈ Avgδ2ZPP, then
there is a constant δ1 > 0 such that L1 ∈ Avgδ1ZPP.
For every s1(n) ≤ s2(n), there is a one-sided mapping reduction from MKTP[s1(n)]
to MKTP[s2(n)]. (The identity mapping is a valid reduction [43].) Similarly, for every
s1, t1, s2, t2 such that an alternating machine of description length s1 and (alternating) time
log t1 can be compiled into a deterministic machine of description length s2 and space log t2,
there is a one-sided mapping reduction from NC1-MINKt1 [s1] to L-MINKt2 [s2]. (Again, the
identity mapping is a valid reduction.)
Now we present a one-sided mapping reduction from L-MINKT to MKTP. Actually, the
reduction we present is from L-MINKT to MINKt
′
, where t′(n) = λ log n for some absolute
constant λ > 0.
▶ Theorem 47. For every polynomial t(·) and integer c > 0, there is a constant c′ >
0 such that there is a one-sided mapping reduction Red from L-MINKt[n − c′ log n] to
MINKt
′
[n− c log n].
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Proof. For convenience, denote s(n) := n − c′ log n. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be an input to
L-MINKt[s].
The reduction is simple. It fixes N := poly(t(n)), and reduces a length-n input to a
length-Ñ input, where Ñ := n · ℓDCMD(N). For every bit xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), it samples a
uniformly random string si ∈ {0, 1}ℓDCMD(N), conditioned on that DCMD(si) = xi. Finally,
it outputs the concatenation of s1, s2, . . . , sn.
Since DCMD is balanced (Corollary 29), the reduction maps a random instance to a
random instance. Now it remains to show that it maps a Yes instance to a Yes instance.
Suppose x is a Yes instance. Denote Red(x; r) := s1 ◦ s2 ◦ · · · ◦ sn, where r is the random
coins that our reduction uses. For t′(n) = λ log n, we want to prove that Kt′(Red(x; r)) ≤
Ñ − c log Ñ .
Let U be the universal Turing machine we consider, then there is a description d of length
at most s(n), such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1 and every b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, Ud(i, b) accepts in
space log t(n) if and only if xi = b. Since CMD is L-hard under projections (Theorem 30),
for N = poly(t(n)), there is a DLOGTIME-computable projection
px : {0, 1}s(n) × [n + 1]× {0, 1, ⋆} → {0, 1}ℓCMD(N),
such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1 and b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, xi = b if and only if CMD(px(d, i, b)) = 1.
The description of Red(x; r) contains the string d, and n strings s′1, s′2, . . . , s′n of length
ℓDCMD(N)− 1 each. Let PCMD be the DLOGTIME-computable projection in Theorem 28.
The string s′i is chosen such that PCMD(px(d, i, 1), s′i) = si. (Note that CMD(px(d, i, 1)) =
DCMD(si), so each s′i exists and is unique.)
Let 1 ≤ i ≤ |Red(x; r)|. To compute the i-th bit of Red(x; r), we first “locate” i by
computing k := ⌊ i−1ℓDCMD(N)⌋+ 1, and j := i− ℓDCMD(N)(k−1). Now, the i-th bit of Red(x; r)
is the j-th bit of sk. We can simply calculate the j-th bit of PCMD(p(d, i, 1), s′i), which takes
λ log Ñ time for some absolute constant λ > 0.
It follows that whenever L-Kt(x) ≤ n− c′ log n, regardless of the random bits r we choose,
there is a description that allows us to quickly retrieve each bit of Red(x; r). Moreover, the
description has length n− c′ log n + n(ℓDCMD(N)− 1) = Ñ − c′ log n. If the constant c′ is
big enough compared with c, then Red(x; r) is a Yes instance of MINKt
′
[Ñ − c log Ñ ]. ◀
Note that for c > λ, MINKt
′
[n − c log n] reduces to MKTP[n − (c − λ) log n] via the
identity mapping. (See the proof of Theorem 48.) Therefore, Theorem 47 shows a one-sided
mapping reduction from some version of MINKT to some version of MKTP. To the best of
our knowledge, this reduction is the first result of its kind.
Moreover, Theorem 47 demonstrates the robustness of meta-complexity w.r.t. the zero-
error average-case complexity. In particular:
▶ Theorem 48. Let t(·) be a fixed polynomial such that t(n) > 2n. The following are
equivalent:
1. There is a constant c > 0 such that NC1-MINKt[n− c log n] ∈ AvgΩ(1)ZPP.
2. There is a constant c > 0 such that L-MINKt[n− c log n] ∈ AvgΩ(1)ZPP.
3. There is a constant c > 0 such that MINKt
′
[n − c log n] ∈ AvgΩ(1)ZPP, where t′(n) =
λ log n is defined above.
Moreover, the above items are implied by the following items:
4. There is a constant c > 0 such that MKTP[n− c log n] ∈ AvgΩ(1)ZPP.
H. Ren and R. Santhanam 35:29
Proof. (4) =⇒ (3): It suffices to show that for every c > 0, the identity mapping
reduces MINKt
′
[n− c′ log n] to MKTP[n− c log n], where c′ = c + λ. Let x ∈ MINKt
′
[n−
c′ log n] ∩ {0, 1}n, and d be a description of length n − c′ log n witnessing the fact that
Kt′(x) ≤ n − c′ log n. Since (d, t′(n)) is also a witness that KT(x) ≤ n − c log n. we have
x ∈ NC1-MKTP[n− c log n].
(3) =⇒ (2): By Theorem 47 and Fact 46.
(3) =⇒ (1): Note that the only property of L used in the proof of Theorem 47 is that
CMD is hard for L. (In other words, L ⊆ ⊕L.) As CMD is also hard for NC1, the proof of
Theorem 47 is also true for L-MINKT replaced by NC1-MINKT.
(2) =⇒ (3): Every machine that runs in t′(n) time also runs in t′(n) space. Therefore,
for every c > 0, the identity mapping reduces MINKt
′
[n− c′ log n] to L-MINKt1 [n− c log n],
where t1(n) = 2O(t
′(n)). We can use a padding trick [62, Theorem 5.6] to reduce L-MINKt1
to L-MINKt.
(1) =⇒ (3): The same argument as (2) =⇒ (3) also works for NC1-Kt. ◀
5 Tighter Connections between Meta-Complexity and One-Way
Functions
In this section, we present a tighter connection between the hardness of MINKT (or MKTP)
and the maximum security of weak one-way functions. We first define the security of weak
one-way functions.
▶ Definition 49. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a function. We say f is a weak one-way




[C(f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))] ≤ 1− 1
p(n) .
Our main results are as follows.
▶ Theorem 50. Let S(n) be any monotone function such that S(n + O(log2 n)) ≤ S(n) ·
nO(log n). The following are equivalent:
(a) There is a weak one-way function with security S(n) · nΘ(log n).
(b) There are polynomials p, t such that the search version of Kt requires S(n) · nΘ(log n) size
to compute on a 1− 1/p(n) fraction of inputs.
(c) For every constant λ > 0, there are polynomials p, t, such that Kt requires S(n) ·nΘ(log n)
size to (λ log n)-approximate on a 1− 1/p(n) fraction of inputs.
▶ Theorem 51. Suppose there is a weak one-way function f with security 2Ω(n) computable
in DLOGTIME. Then there is a polynomial p such that KT requires 2Ω(n) size to compute on
a 1− 1/p(n) fraction of inputs.
▶ Remark 52. A few remarks are in order.
In this section, we only consider non-uniform adversaries. The reason is that we will
use Impagliazzo’s hardcore lemma (Lemma 84) in the proof of Theorem 57, which only
works for non-uniform adversaries. We remark that there are hardcore lemmas that
also work for uniform adversaries: if there is no time-t′ algorithm that inverts a weak
one-way function on a 1− o(1) fraction of inputs, then there is no time-t algorithm that
non-trivially inverts every hardcore of the same one-way function. However, we do not
know whether the dependence of t′ on t is tight. Theorem 4.5 of [86] achieves t′ = poly(t),
but we need t′ = t · polylog(t). We leave this issue for future work.
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Our equivalence only holds for weak one-way functions. Indeed, it is an open problem
whether the existence of exponentially-hard weak one-way functions is equivalent to the
existence of exponentially-hard strong one-way functions [31]. Yao’s hardness amplification
theorem (Theorem 23) blows up the input length by a polynomial factor, therefore given a
2Ω(n)-hard weak one-way function, it only produces a 2nΩ(1) -hard strong one-way function.
Our result for KT (Theorem 51) is weaker than our result for Kt. In particular, suppose
the one-way function has security 2αn, we can only show that KT requires 2βn size on
average, for some constant β that is much smaller than α.
The best seed length of known explicit extractors that extract all min-entropy is O(log2 n)
[36]. This is why we see an nΘ(log n) factor in Theorem 50.
We rely on the construction of condEP-PRGs from weak one-way functions in [93, 62],
thus we structure this section as follows. In Section 5.1, we define extractors and hardcore
functions, which are technical building blocks of the construction. In Section 5.2, we describe
the construction in [93, 62]. (The correctness of this construction is proved in Appendix A.)
The proofs of Theorem 50 and 51 appear in Section 5.3 and 5.4 respectively.
5.1 Technical Building Blocks
5.1.1 Extractors
▶ Definition 53. A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, ϵ)-extractor if for
every random variable X over {0, 1}n such that H∞(X) ≥ k, the statistical distance between
Ext(X,Ud) and Um is at most ϵ.
Moreover, Ext is a strong (k, ϵ)-extractor if for every random variable X as above, the
statistical distance between Ext(X,Ud) and Um is at most ϵ, even conditioned on the seed.
That is, the statistical distance between the following two distributions is at most ϵ:
D1 := (r ◦ Ext(x, r) | r← Ud, x← X), and D2 := Ud+m.
5.1.2 Hardcore Functions
▶ Definition 54. Let ϵ = ϵ(n) > 0, L = L(n) ≤ poly(n), HC : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be
a function, and R be a probabilistic oracle algorithm. We say HC is a hardcore function with
reconstruction algorithm R, distinguishing probability ϵ, and list size L, if the following holds.
On every oracle O, RO outputs a list of L strings of length n.
For every string x and every oracle O that ϵ-distinguishes Ud ◦ HC(x,Ud) from Ud+m, x
is in the list output by RO w.p. ≥ 1/2.
Our definition of hardcore functions indeed implies the standard definition in [32]:
▶ Fact 55. Let HC : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a hardcore function with a poly(n)-time
reconstruction algorithm, distinguishing probability ϵ = 1/poly(n), and list size L ≤ poly(n).
Let f be any one-way function, x← Un, and r← Ud. No polynomial-size adversary can
2ϵ-distinguish the distribution f(x) ◦ r ◦ HC(x, r) from the distribution f(x) ◦ r ◦ Um.
Proof. Let A be an adversary of size poly(n) that 2ϵ-distinguishes the distribution f(x) ◦ r ◦
HC(x, r) from f(x) ◦ r ◦ Um. Say x ∈ {0, 1}n is good if A can ϵ-distinguish f(x) ◦ r ◦HC(x, r)
from f(x) ◦ r ◦ Um. Then by a Markov bound, at least an ϵ fraction of inputs x are good.
We will use A to invert f(x) on every good input x in probabilistic polynomial time. Our
inversion algorithm will have success probability 1/2 on a good x; as (ϵ/2) > 1/poly(n), this
contradicts the one-wayness of f .
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On input y = f(x), where x is good, define the oracle
O(z) := A(y, z).
Then O can ϵ-distinguish Ud ◦ HC(x,Ud) from Ud+m. The reconstruction algorithm RO
outputs a list of size poly(n) which contains x. We could easily find any element x′ in this
list such that f(x′) = y, and output x′. With probability 1/2 over the internal randomness
of R, we invert y successfully. ◀
5.2 CondEP-PRGs from Weak One-Way Functions
In this section, we present the following construction from weak one-way functions to
condEP-PRGs.
▶ Construction 56 ([93, 62]). Let 0 < ϵ < 110n2 be the desired security parameter of the
condEP-PRG (i.e., it should be O(ϵ)-indistinguishable from uniformly random strings).
Let δ > 0, and f be a weak one-way function that is hard to invert on a (1− δ) fraction
of inputs. Let α > 0 be the desired stretch of our condEP-PRG. Suppose we have the
following objects:
For every k, a strong (k, ϵ)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with optimal
output length, where d := dExt(n, ϵ) and m := k − 2 log(1/ϵ)−O(1). We write the
extractor as Ext(k) if we need to emphasize the min-entropy parameter k.
For kHC := α + log(n/δ) + 4 log(1/ϵ) + O(1), a hardcore function HC : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}d′ → {0, 1}kHC with poly(n/ϵ)-time reconstruction algorithm R, distinguishing
probability ϵ, and list size L ≤ poly(n/ϵ), where d′ := dHC(n, kHC, ϵ).
Let Gn,r : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d × {0, 1}d × {0, 1}d
′ → {0, 1}n+2d+d′+α be the following
construction:
Gn,r(x, z1, z2, z3) := z1◦Ext(r−1)(x, z1)◦z2◦Ext(⌊n−r−log(2n/δ)⌋)(f(x), z2)◦z3◦HC(x, z3).
▶ Theorem 57. Let ϵ, δ, α, f be defined as in Construction 56. If ϵ ≥ 1/poly(n) and
L ≤ poly(n), then there is a function r : N→ N such that G = {Gn,r(n)}n∈N is a condEP-
PRG with stretch α and security 4ϵ.
More precisely, let ñ = n + 2d + d′. Suppose that for every subset D ⊆ {0, 1}ñ such that
H(G(D)) ≥ ñ− Ω(log( nδϵ )) and every k, there is an adversary of size s that 4ϵ-distinguishes
Gn,k(D) from the uniform random distribution. Then there is an adversary of size s ·
poly(nL/ϵ) that inverts f on a 1− δ fraction of inputs.
The proof basically follows from [62], and we present a self-contained proof in Appendix A.
However, there are two major differences between our proof and the proof in [62]:
We replace the extractors and hardcore functions with better constructions. In particular,
our extractors and hardcore functions in Section 5.3 requires only O(log2 n) random bits.
More importantly, in the very beginning, we need to transform the weak one-way function
into a strong one. [62] uses hardness amplification (Theorem 23) to implement this
step. However, Theorem 23 does not preserve exponential security, therefore we use
Impagliazzo’s hardcore lemma [49] instead. We only obtain a strong one-way function on
a “hardcore” distribution of inputs (instead of the uniform distribution), but this already
suffices for our purpose.
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5.2.1 Warm-Up: Proof of Theorem 25
Theorem 57 immediately implies Theorem 25.
▶ Theorem 25 ([62]). There is a function EP-PRG computable in ALOGTIME, such that the
following holds. For any one-way function f : {0, 1}⋆ → {0, 1}⋆ and any constant γ > 0, let
G(x, z) = EP-PRG(γ, x, f(x), z), then G is a condEP-PRG with stretch γ log n and security
1/nγ .
We first introduce the (very simple) extractors and hardcore functions used in [93, 62].
The extractors are derived from the leftover hash lemma [38]. (See also [85, Theorem
6.18].) Let h : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a pairwise independent family of hash
functions, where d = O(n + m), then for every k, ϵ such that m = k− 2 log(1/ϵ), h is also
a strong (k, ϵ)-extractor.
We instantiate the pairwise independent hash family by Toeplitz matrices.15 More
precisely, our keys will have length d := n + m − 1, and every key ∈ {0, 1}n+m−1
corresponds to a Toeplitz matrix. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ m and every input x ∈ {0, 1}n, the
i-th output of H(x, key) is the inner product of x and keyi∼(i+n−1) (the substring of key
from the i-th bit to the (i + n− 1)-th bit) in GF(2). In other words, Ext(x, key) is the
concatenation of ⟨x, keyi∼(i+n−1)⟩ for each i, where ⟨·, ·⟩ denotes inner product.
Let GL : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}k be the Goldreich-Levin hardcore function.
In [32], GL is defined in terms of Toeplitz matrices (again). Let d := n + k − 1. For
every x ∈ {0, 1}n, r ∈ {0, 1}d and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the i-th output bit of GL(x, r) is the inner
product of x and ri∼(i+n−1) in GF(2). Also, it is shown in [32] that for every ϵ > 0, GL
is a hardcore function with distinguishing probability ϵ and list size poly(n · 2k/ϵ).
Proof Sketch of Theorem 25. We can plug the parameters ϵ := 14nγ , α := γ log n, δ := 1/2
into Theorem 57. The list size of GL is L ≤ poly(n). Theorem 57 gives us a function
r : N→ N such that {Gn,r(n)} is a condEP-PRG with stretch γ log n and security 1/nγ . We
can easily construct a uniform condEP-PRG with essentially the same stretch and security:
We parse the input as an integer r ≤ n, a string x of length n, and some garbage w. Then
we output Gn,r(x) ◦ w.
Now we implement EP-PRG in alternating time c log n, for some absolute constant c > 0
independent of γ. On input (γ, x, f(x), z, i), we want to compute the i-th output bit of our
condEP-PRG. This bit is either equal to some input bit, or the inner product of two length-n
sub-strings of the input. It is easy to implement either case in alternating O(log n) time. ◀
5.3 Proof of Theorem 50
To prove Theorem 50, we replace the leftover hash lemma and GL by extractors and hardcore
functions with very short seed length:
▶ Theorem 58 ([36, Theorem 5.14]). Let dExt(n, ϵ) := O(log n · log(n/ϵ)), then for every
1 ≤ k ≤ n and ϵ > 0, there is a strong (k, ϵ)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dExt(n,ϵ) → {0, 1}m,
where m = k − 2 log(1/ϵ)−O(1) is optimal.
15 An n × m matrix M is Toeplitz if Mi,j = Mi+1,j+1 holds for every 1 ≤ i < n, 1 ≤ j < m. We can
represent a Toeplitz matrix by n + m − 1 elements, namely the elements in the first row and the first
column.
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We observe that the “k-wise direct product generator” used in [42, 41] is a good hardcore
function:
▶ Theorem 59. Let dHC(n, k, ϵ) := O(k log(n/ϵ)), then there is a hardcore function HC :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}dHC(n,k,ϵ) → {0, 1}k with a poly(n2k/ϵ)-time reconstruction algorithm R,
distinguishing probability ϵ, and list size L ≤ 2k · poly(k/ϵ).
Proof Sketch. Consider the function DP : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d+k defined in [41,
Theorem 7.1]. The first d bits of DP(x, z) is always equal to z, and we let HC(x, z) be the
remaining k bits of DP(x, z).
In [41], the reconstruction algorithm is stated as RO : {0, 1}a × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n. Here,
a ≤ k + O(log(k/ϵ)) is the “advice complexity” of DP, the first a input bits correspond to
the advice, and the remaining r = poly(n/ϵ) input bits are random coins used by R. For
every x ∈ {0, 1}n and every oracle O that ϵ-distinguishes DP(x,Ud) from Ud+k, we have
Pr
w←Ur
[∃α ∈ {0, 1}a, RO(α, w) = x] ≥ 3/4.
Our reconstruction algorithm simply samples a random w← Ur, and outputs RO(α, w)
for every α ∈ {0, 1}a. It follows that the list size is L(n, k, ϵ) ≤ 2a ≤ 2kpoly(k/ϵ). ◀
Now we use Construction 56 to prove Theorem 50.
▶ Theorem 50. Let S(n) be any monotone function such that S(n + O(log2 n)) ≤ S(n) ·
nO(log n). The following are equivalent:
(a) There is a weak one-way function with security S(n) · nΘ(log n).
(b) There are polynomials p, t such that the search version of Kt requires S(n) · nΘ(log n) size
to compute on a 1− 1/p(n) fraction of inputs.
(c) For every constant λ > 0, there are polynomials p, t, such that Kt requires S(n) ·nΘ(log n)
size to (λ log n)-approximate on a 1− 1/p(n) fraction of inputs.
Proof Sketch. (c) =⇒ (b) is trivial.
(b) =⇒ (a): Suppose that the search version of Kt requires S(n) ·nΘ(log n) size to solve on
a 1/p(n) fraction of inputs, where p is a polynomial. The construction in [62, Section 4] shows
that there is a weak one-way function f , such that every adversary of size S(n) · nΘ(log n)
only inverts an 1− 1/q(n) fraction of inputs, where q(n) := O(n · p(n)2).
(a) =⇒ (c): Suppose there is a constant λ > 0 such that, for every polynomial p, there
is an algorithm of size S(n) · nΘ(log n) that approximates Kt on a 1 − 1/p(n) fraction of
inputs, within an additive error of λ log n. Let f be a candidate weak one-way function,
δ := 1/q(n) for any polynomial q, and ϵ := 1/n2. Let α := (λ + C) log n be the stretch of
the condEP-PRG we construct, where C is a large absolute constant. Let r : N → N be
any function. Consider the function Gn,r(n) in Construction 56, where the input length of
Gn,r(n) is
ñ := n + 2dExt(n, ϵ) + dHC(n, O(log(n/(δϵ))), ϵ) = n + O(log2 n).
Suppose G runs in t(ñ) time, then every output y of G satisfies Kt(|y|)(y) ≤ ñ−(λ+2) log ñ.
Consider any sequence of subsets E = {En ⊆ {0, 1}n} such that H(Gn,r(n)(En)) ≥
ñ− Ω(log n). The same argument as in Lemma 39 shows that there is an adversary of size
S(ñ) · ñΘ(log ñ) ≤ S(n) · nΘ(log n)
that 4ϵ-distinguishes Gn,r(n)(En) from the uniform distribution. It follows that there is an
adversary of size S(n) · nΘ(log n) that inverts f on a 1− δ fraction of inputs. Therefore, there
is no weak one-way function with hardness S(n) · nΘ(log n). ◀
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5.4 Proof of Theorem 51
To prove Theorem 51, we need a family of universal hash functions that admit very efficient
randomized encodings, constructed in [56, 10]. In [10], it was also proved that such hash
functions are good extractors (by the leftover hash lemma) and hardcore functions (based on
previous works [44, 15]).
In the construction of [11], for a (Boolean) function computable by a parity branching
program of size S, its randomized encoding needs at least Ω(S2) additional random input
bits. Even worse, if such a function has m output bits, the randomized encoding requires
Ω(mS2) random input bits. However, to prove Theorem 51, we need to preserve exponential
hardness of our one-way function, which means our extractors and hardcore functions can
only have O(n) random input bits. This is exactly what [10] does. In particular, for a “skew”
circuit C of size S and possibly many outputs, the randomized encoding of C in [10] only
requires O(S) additional random inputs. Such circuits of linear size can already compute
many powerful objects, e.g. universal hash functions [56].
5.4.1 Randomized Encodings for Skew Circuits
We introduce the randomized encodings in [10] in more detail.
We consider circuits that consist of AND and XOR gates of fan-in 2, with multiple
output gates. Let C be such a circuit, X be a subset of input variables. (For example, let
C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, we may think of X as the last d input variables.) We say
C is skew with respect to X, if every AND gate in C has at least one child labeled by a
constant or a variable in X. In particular, this implies that if we substitute the variables in
X by (arbitrary) constants, the function that C computes is a linear function on variables
not in X – each output bit is simply the XOR of a subset of these variables.
Let C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d+m be a skew circuit w.r.t. the last d inputs, such that
the first d outputs of C is always equal to the last d inputs of C.16 Let s be the number of
internal (i.e. non-input, non-output) gates of C. The randomized encoding of C, denoted as
C̃, is a function C̃ : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d+s → {0, 1}d+m+s defined as follows:
The inputs of C̃ are x ∈ {0, 1}n, w ∈ {0, 1}d, and r ∈ {0, 1}s.
For each (input, internal, or output) gate g ∈ C, we associate a bit r(g) with it. Each
input gate is associated with its input value (i.e. r(g) = xi or wi), the i-th internal gate
is associated with r(g) = ri, and every output gate is associated with r(g) = 0.
The first d outputs of C̃ are simply w. The remaining m + s outputs correspond to
the internal gates and output gates of C. Let the i-th such gate be gi = gj▽gk (where
▽ ∈ {AND, XOR}), then the i-th output is r(gi) XOR (r(gj)▽r(gk)).
5.4.2 Highly-Uniform Linear-Size Hash Functions
As we are dealing with KT complexity, we will need the randomized encoding to be computable
in DLOGTIME. Therefore, our skew circuits need to be very uniform. We state our definition
of uniform skew circuits as follows; it is easy to see that if a family of skew circuits {Cn} is
uniform, then their randomized encodings can indeed be computed in DLOGTIME.
16 That is, we pad the last d inputs at the beginning of our outputs, and the remaining m output bits are
the “real” outputs of C. This is a technical restriction on C to ensure its randomized encoding exists.
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▶ Definition 60 (Uniform Skew Circuits). Let C = {Cn : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d(n) → {0, 1}s(n)} be
a family of skew circuits, where d(n) and s(n) are computable in time O(log n). Moreover,
assume that the fan-out of every gate is at most 2, and the last s(n) gates (i.e., gates with
the largest indices) are output gates.
We say that C is a uniform family of skew circuits, if there is an algorithm A with time
complexity linear in its input length, that on inputs n, i (in binary), outputs the information
about the i-th gate in Cn. This includes the gate type (input, AND, or XOR), indices of its
input gates (if they exist), and indices of the (at most 2) gates it feeds to.
▶ Remark 61. It may seem strange that we need to output not only predecessors but also
successors of each gate. The reason is that in [56], we will need to reverse each wire when
we transform an encoding circuit to an “exposure resilient function”. In particular, after
that construction, the predecessors of each gate will become their previous successors. See
Appendix B.4 for details.
We need a family of universal hash functions H = {hn,m : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}m}
in [56], where k = O(n + m). This family has the following important property: H can be
computed by a family of linear-size uniform circuits that are skew w.r.t. the second argument
(i.e. the last k bits).
▶ Theorem 62. For every integer n, m where m = O(n), there exists an integer k = O(n),
and a family of universal hash functions {hn,m : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}k → {0, 1}m}, such that hn,m
can be computed by a uniform family of linear-size circuits that are skew w.r.t. the second
argument.
In [56], the authors showed that H can be computed by a family of linear-size skew
circuits, but they did not show that the circuits are uniform. Therefore, we include a proof
sketch of Theorem 62 in Appendix B, with an emphasis on the uniformity of these circuits.
By the leftover hash lemma of [38], {hn,m} is a strong (k, ϵ)-extractor whenever m =
k− 2 log(1/ϵ). It was proved by [15] (based on [44]) that {hn,m} are good hardcore functions:
▶ Lemma 63. For every ϵ > 0, hn,m is a hardcore function with distinguishing probability
ϵ and a reconstruction algorithm of poly(2m · n/ϵ) time. (As a result, the list size is also
poly(2m · n/ϵ).)
5.4.3 Proof of Theorem 51
▶ Theorem 51. Suppose there is a weak one-way function f with security 2Ω(n) computable
in DLOGTIME. Then there is a polynomial p such that KT requires 2Ω(n) size to compute on
a 1− 1/p(n) fraction of inputs.
Proof Sketch. Let δ = 1/poly(n) such that f is hard to invert on a (1 − δ) fraction of
inputs. We plug the hash functions h (which are also extractors and hardcore functions)
into Construction 56, to build a condEP-PRG G : {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n1+α with stretch
α := O(log n) and security 4ϵ ≤ 1/n10. Here, since the seed length of h is O(n), we have
n1 = O(n). Moreover, by Theorem 57, the condEP-PRG is 4ϵ-indistinguishable from the
uniform distribution by 2Ω(n)-size adversaries.
As the hash functions admit a uniform family of skew circuits, the following is true:
There is a (uniform) circuit C such that G(x, z) = C(x, f(x), z), and C is a size-O(n) skew
circuit w.r.t. the z argument. We replace C by its randomized encoding to obtain another
condEP-PRG G̃ : {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}n2+α, which is computable in DLOGTIME. Here, since the
size of C is O(n), we have n2 = O(n). As every output of G̃ has non-trivial KT complexity,
and G̃ is 4ϵ-indistinguishable from the uniform distribution by 2Ω(n)-size adversaries, we can
see that KT is hard on average. ◀
CCC 2021
35:36 Hardness of KT Characterizes Parallel Cryptography
5.5 The Perebor Hypotheses
We mention some Perebor hypotheses as further research directions. Each hypothesis states
that to some extent, “Perebor,” or brute-force search, is unavoidable to solve a certain
meta-complexity problem. In this paper, we only consider the (bounded-error) average-
case complexity of these problems, but similar hypotheses for the worst-case or zero-error
average-case complexity can also be made. We only state these hypotheses against (uniform)
randomized algorithms; the corresponding hypotheses against non-uniform algorithms (i.e.,
circuits) will be called “non-uniform Perebor hypotheses” accordingly.
These hypotheses are inspired by, and parallel to, the “exponential time hypotheses”
for satisfiability [52, 53, 20]. The exponential time hypothesis (ETH) asserts that 3-SAT
requires 2ϵn time to solve, where ϵ > 0 is some absolute constant and n is the number of
variables. The strong exponential time hypothesis (SETH) asserts that for any constant
ϵ > 0, CNF-SAT requires 2(1−ϵ)n time to solve. There is a large body of work on these
two hypotheses and their variants; in particular, SETH has been a central hypothesis in
fine-grained complexity [91].
We believe that the future study of these Perebor hypotheses will bring us more insights
into complexity theory, similar to what the study of ETH and SETH has brought us.
The weak Perebor hypotheses. We introduce the following two hypotheses for Kt and KT:
▶ Hypothesis 64 (Weak Perebor Hypothesis for Kt). There is a polynomial t(n) ≥ 2n and an
absolute constant c ≥ 1 such that the following holds. Every randomized algorithm that runs
in 2n/c time and attempts to solve Kt fails w.p. at least 1/nc over a uniformly random input.
▶ Hypothesis 65 (Weak Perebor Hypothesis for KT). There is an absolute constant c ≥ 1 such
that the following holds. Every randomized algorithm that runs in 2n/c time and attempts to
solve KT fails w.p. at least 1/nc over a uniformly random input.
Theorem 50 shows that the non-uniform version of Hypothesis 64 is equivalent to the
existence of exponentially-hard weak one-way functions (against non-uniform adversaries).
Theorem 51 shows that the non-uniform version of Hypothesis 65 is implied by the existence
of exponentially-hard weak one-way function computable in DLOGTIME (also against non-
uniform adversaries).
The strong Perebor hypotheses. We start with the following hypothesis:
▶ Hypothesis 66 (Strong Perebor Hypothesis for Kt). There are polynomials t(n) ≥ 2n and
p(n), such that for every constant ϵ > 0, every probabilistic algorithm that runs in 2(1−ϵ)n
time and attempts to solve Kt fails w.p. at least 1/p(n) over a uniformly random input.
By Theorem 50, the non-uniform version of Hypothesis 66 is equivalent to the existence
of weak one-way functions with hardness 2(1−o(1))n (against non-uniform adversaries).
However, Building on Hellman [39], Fiat and Naor [27] showed that no such one-way
function exists in the non-uniform RAM model. In particular, for any function f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n, there is an algorithm that runs in 23n/4 time, with random access to an advice tape
of length 23n/4, and inverts f at any point. It is conceivable that a similar attack could also
be implemented in circuits, i.e. every function f could be inverted by a circuit of size 299n/100
in the worst-case. This gives strong evidence that the non-uniform version of Hypothesis 66
is false. To the best of our knowledge, (the uniform version of) Hypothesis 66 seems secure.
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Following [16, Section 1.1], if we still want (non-uniform) maximum hardness, we can
consider collections of one-way functions, which corresponds to the conditional (time-bounded)
Kolmogorov complexity.
Fix a universal Turing machine U , let x, y be two strings and t be a time bound. Define
cKt(x | y) as the length of the smallest description d, such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |x|+ 1 and
b ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}, Ud,y(i, b) accepts in time t if and only if xi = b. Note that the universal Turing
machine is given random access to y (for free), hence d is a description of x conditioned on y.
We assume that the default input distribution of cKt consists of a random string x and a
random string y, both of input length n. Hence in the hypothesis below, we actually state
that no non-uniform algorithm of 2(1−ϵ)n size can solve cKt on input length 2n.
▶ Hypothesis 67 (Strong Perebor Hypothesis for cKt; Non-uniform Version). There are
polynomials t(n) ≥ 2n and p(n), such that for every constant ϵ > 0, the following holds.
Every non-uniform algorithm of 2(1−ϵ)n size that attempts to solve cKt fails on a 1/p(n)
fraction of inputs.
6 MCSP-Related Results
In this section, we generalize Theorem 1 to the case of MCSP. Throughout this section, we
maintain the convention that our input is the truth table of a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1},
and N = 2n is the input length. We use tt to denote an input truth table. Recall that
Size(tt) is the circuit complexity of tt. The size of a circuit is always measured in gates. We
consider circuits over the B2 basis, i.e., a gate can compute any function over its 2 inputs.
▶ Theorem 3 (Informal). The following are true:
If MCSP is exponentially hard on average, then there is a (super-polynomially hard)
one-way function.
If there is an exponentially hard weak one-way function in NC0, then MCSP is (exponen-
tially) hard on average.
Ideally, we would like to prove that MCSP is bounded-error hard on average if and only
if there is a one-way function in DLOGTIME. However, we could only prove weaker results,
since we do not have good understandings of the circuit complexity of a random Boolean
function.
For KT complexity, we know that a random string x of length N is likely to satisfy that
KT(x) ∈ [N −O(log N), N + O(log N)]. That is, N is a good estimate of the KT complexity
of a random string, within additive error η := O(log N). It turns out that the overhead
of [62] is 2O(η), which is polynomial in N .
What about MCSP? For the maximum circuit complexity function, we only know that:
▶ Theorem 68 ([28]). There is a constant c such that the following is true. Let C(n) be





















Therefore, given a random truth table tt of length N = 2n, we could use any value
between Clb(n) and Cub(n) as an estimate of Size(tt). However, we could only prove that
our additive error is η := (Cub(n)− Clb(n)) ·O(n) = O(2n log n/n).17 The overhead in [62]
would be
17 The extra O(n) factor is because we measure η by bit-complexity instead of gate-complexity, and every
gate in the (maximum) circuit needs O(n) bits to describe.
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Nevertheless, as η = o(N) is non-trivial, we can still achieve non-trivial results for MCSP.
▶ Remark 69. Ilango encountered a similar issue in his search-to-decision reduction for
MFSP (Minimum Formula Size Problem) [46]. The additive error for formula complexity is
η := O(N/ log log N), thus Ilango only managed to show an (average-case) reduction with
time complexity 2O(η) unconditionally.
Comparing [46] and our work, the 2O(η) factor comes from different reasons. Ilango’s
algorithm runs in time poly(t) where t is the number of “near-optimal” formulas for the
input truth table; the current best upper bound of t for a random truth table is 2O(η). In our
paper, we need to sample a uniformly random circuit (w.r.t. some encoding), and let p be
the probability that the truth table of a sampled circuit is equal to a given one; the current
best lower bound of p is 2−N−O(η). (See Section 6.2.) It is an interesting open problem to
improve either estimate.
6.1 Preliminaries
6.1.1 Extreme Hardness Amplification for One-Way Functions
We will construct a one-way function fMCSP based on the assumption that MCSP is exponen-
tially hard on average. However, we are only able to prove that fMCSP is hard to invert on
an inverse-sub-exponential fraction (2−o(N)) of inputs. We will need the following variant of
Theorem 23, that constructs a strong one-way function (of super-polynomial hardness) from
such a one-way function that is “exponentially hard” but also “(sub)exponentially weak”.
▶ Theorem 70. Let p(n) = 2o(n), f be a length-preserving function that is exponentially
hard to invert on a 1/p(n) fraction of inputs. In other words, there is a constant ϵ > 0 such







Then there exists a one-way function.
Proof Sketch. We verify that the standard proof for Theorem 23 also works in our setting.
We use notations in [30, Theorem 2.3.2]. Let f be a candidate weak one-way function, and
m(n) := n2 · p(n) < 2o(n). By [30, Theorem 2.3.2], we can construct a function g on m(n)
inputs bits, such that the following holds. Given any adversary B that inverts g w.p. 1/q(m),
we can construct an adversary that makes a(n) := 2n2p(n)q(m(n)) calls to B on input length
m(n), and inverts f w.p. 1− 1/p(n).
Suppose that g is not a one-way function. Then there is a polynomial q and an adversary
B that runs in q(m) time and inverts g w.p. 1/q(m). We can invert f w.p. 1− 1/p(n) by an
adversary of time complexity
O(a(n) · q(m(n))) < 2o(n),
contradicting the hardness of f . ◀
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6.1.2 Maximum Circuit Complexity
It will be convenient to fix an encoding of circuits into binary strings, so that we can sample
a uniformly random circuit with a certain description length. Fortunately, such an encoding
scheme naturally occurs in the lower bound proofs for the maximum circuit complexity, which
usually use a counting argument [77, 28]: If every circuit of size LB(n) can be encoded as a
string of length 2n − 1, then there must exist an n-bit Boolean function without size-LB(n)
circuits.
In particular, in the lower bound proof of [28], the authors represented a circuit as a
stack program. For a detailed description of stack programs, the reader is referred to [28].
We only need the following property of them:
▶ Theorem 71. There is a constant c such that every size-s circuit on n inputs can be
encoded into a stack program of bit-length (s + 1)(c + log(n + s)).
We also need the fact that given the description of a stack program, we can compute its
truth table (the truth table of the circuit corresponding to it) in polynomial time.
We define
C ′ub(n) := (Cub(n) + 1)(log(n + Cub(n)) + O(1)) ≤ 2n
(






By Theorem 71, every Boolean function over n inputs has a stack program of bit-length
C ′ub(n).
We also need the following theorem, which says that for any Boolean function f on n
input bits, there is a circuit of size roughly 2n/n that computes f simultaneously on multiple
inputs.
▶ Theorem 72 ([83, 84]; see also [88, p. 304]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be any Boolean
function, r be a constant. There is a circuit C of size at most (1 + o(1))2n/n such that for
every x1, x2, . . . , xr ∈ {0, 1}n, C(x1, x2, . . . , xr) = f(x1) ◦ f(x2) ◦ · · · ◦ f(xr).
6.2 One-Way Functions from Hardness of MCSP
In this section, we construct a one-way function assuming MCSP is (exponentially) hard on
average.
▶ Theorem 73. Suppose that MCSP is exponentially hard on average. In particular, there
is a constant ϵ > 0 and a function q(N) = 2o(N), such that for every randomized algorithm
A running in 2ϵN time,
Pr
tt←UN
[A(tt) = Size(tt)] ≤ 1− 1/q(N).
Then there exists a one-way function.
Proof. By Theorem 70, it suffices to construct a length-preserving function f that satisfies
the following one-wayness property: There is a function p(Ñ) = 2o(Ñ), such that for every
integer Ñ and every randomized algorithm A that runs in 2ϵÑ/10 time,
Pr
x←UÑ
[A(f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))] ≤ 1− 1/p(Ñ). (3)
Let Ñ be the input length of f , n be the largest integer such that n + C ′ub(n) ≤ Ñ .
(Recall that every Boolean function over n inputs can be represented by a circuit, or stack
program, of bit-length C ′ub(n).) The first n bits of the input denote an integer s ≤ Cub(n),
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and the next C ′ub(n) bits denote a circuit C of size at most s. If the input is invalid (e.g., if
s > Cub(n) or the size of C is strictly larger than s), our function outputs ⊥. Otherwise it
outputs s and tt(C), where tt(C) is the length-2n truth table of C. In other words, our weak
one-way function is defined as follows:
f(s, C) = s ◦ tt(C).
Let Aowf be any candidate adversary that tries to invert f . We will construct an algorithm
AMCSP based on Aowf as in Algorithm 3. In particular, AMCSP attempts to solve MCSP
on truth tables of length N := 2n, using Aowf that attempts to invert f on input length Ñ .
For large enough n, we have Ñ ≤ 2N , thus if Aowf runs in 2ϵÑ/10 time, then AMCSP runs in
2ϵN time. Then, by the hardness of MCSP, AMCSP does not compute the circuit complexity
correctly on a significant fraction of truth tables. Based on that, we can show that Aowf
satisfies Equation (3).
Algorithm 3 Bounded-Error Heuristic AMCSP for MCSP from Inverter Aowf for f .
1: function AMCSP(tt)
2: opt← +∞
3: for s ∈ [Cub(n)] do
4: (s′, C)← Aowf(s, tt)
5: if tt(C) = tt then
6: opt← min{opt, |C|}
7: return opt
Let Err be the set of truth tables tt ∈ {0, 1}N on which AMCSP fails to output the correct
answer w.p. ≥ 1/2q(N). By the hardness of MCSP and a Markov bound, we have
|Err|/2N ≥ 1− 1− 1/q(N)1− 1/2q(N) ≥
1
2q(N)− 1 .
We can see that Aowf fails on every input of the form (Size(tt), tt) where tt ∈ Err, also
w.p. ≥ 1/2q(N). Every such input is generated in the OWF experiment w.p. at least
1/2C′ub(n)+n. That is:









N log log N
log N )) · (1/2q(N))
≥ 1
(2q(N)− 1)2q(N)2O(
N log log N
log N )
.
Let p(Ñ) := (2q(N) − 1)2q(N)2O(
N log log N
log N ). It is indeed the case that p(Ñ) = 2o(Ñ),
since N = 2n ≥ Ω(Ñ), and q(N) = 2o(N). We can see that every adversary Aowf that runs
in 2ϵÑ/10 time fails to invert a random output of f w.p. ≥ p(Ñ). ◀
6.3 Hardness of MCSP from DLOGTIME One-Way Functions
We establish a weak converse of Theorem 73. We show that if there is an exponentially hard
weak one-way function in DLOGTIME, then MCSP is (also exponentially) hard on average.
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▶ Theorem 74. Suppose that there is a weak one-way function f computable in DLOGTIME
with security 2Ω(N). (See Definition 49.) Then, no nonuniform algorithm of size 2o(N) can
solve MCSP on a 1− 2−o(N) fraction of inputs.
Proof. Fix an input length M . Let δ := 1/poly(M), so there is a constant κ1 such that
every adversary of size 2κ1M fails to invert f on a 1 − δ fraction of inputs. We construct
a condEP-PRG G according to Construction 56. The stretch of G is α := κ2M for some
small enough constant κ2 > 0. Its outputs are 4ϵ-indistinguishable from true random strings,
where ϵ := 1/M10. We use the hash functions in Section 5.4 as the extractors and hardcore
functions. Note that the list size of the hardcore function is L := 2O(α). Still, for some
positive constant κ3 = κ1 −O(κ2) > 0, no adversary of size 2κ3M could 4ϵ-distinguish the
outputs of G from random strings.
Let G̃ denote the randomized encoding of G (as in Section 5.4.1). Then, G̃ is a DLOGTIME-
computable condEP-PRG that maps KM input bits to (K + κ2)M input bits, where K is
some absolute constant. W.l.o.g. we may assume that KM is a power of 2 (by padding a
random string to both the input and output of G̃). Again, no adversary of size 2κ3M could
4ϵ-distinguish the outputs of G̃ from random strings. It suffices to prove that the outputs
of G̃, when viewed as truth tables (and padded to length 2KM), have non-trivial circuit
complexity. (As a result, if MCSP can be solved by a size-2o(M) circuit on average, then G̃
is not exponentially secure.)
Now, let N := KM , n := log N , and κ4 := κ2K , then G̃ is a condEP-PRG that maps N
input bits to (1 + κ4)N input bits. Let ttin ∈ {0, 1}N be an input, ttout ∈ {0, 1}2N be the
string whose first (1 + κ4)N bits are G̃(ttin), and other bits are zero.
▷ Claim 75. Size(ttout) ≤ (1 + o(1))2n/n.
Proof. Let r be a constant such that G̃ is a non-adaptive function that makes r queries
to its input. That is, on input i, G̃(ttin) computes the indices q(i, 1), q(i, 2), . . . , q(i, r),
queries (ttin)q(i,j) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ r, and computes (ttout)i based on these answers. Note
that every DLOGTIME machine making r adaptive queries is equivalent to a DLOGTIME
machine making 2r non-adaptive queries, thus it is without loss of generality to assume G̃ is
non-adaptive.
By Theorem 72, there is a circuit C of size (1 + o(1))2n/n that on input (x1, x2, . . . , xr),
outputs the concatenation of (ttin)x1 , (ttin)x2 , . . . , (ttin)xr . We design a circuit for ttout as
follows.
On input i, if i > (1 + κ4)N , then output 0.
Otherwise we simulate G̃(i) to obtain the indices q(i, j) for every 1 ≤ j ≤ r. This step
takes O(n) time, and thus can be implemented in size poly(n).
Use the circuit C of size (1 + o(1))2n/n to obtain (ttin)q(i,j) for every 1 ≤ j ≤ r.
Finally, we can simulate G̃(i) to obtain (ttout)i. Again, this step can be implemented in
size poly(n).
It follows that the circuit complexity of ttout is at most (1 + o(1))2n/n. ◁
On the other hand, let r ∈ {0, 1}(1+κ4)N be a truly random string. We also append zeros
in the end of r to make it a truth table of length 2N . Denote Size(r) the circuit complexity
of this length-2N truth table. Let κ5 := κ4/10, and s := (1 + κ5)2n/n. By Theorem 71, the
number of strings r such that Size(r) ≤ s is at most
2(s+1)(O(1)+log(n+s)) ≤ 2(1+2κ5)N ≪ 2(1+κ4)N .
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It follows that with overwhelming probability, for a random string r ∈ {0, 1}(1+κ4)N ,
Size(r) ≥ (1 + κ5)2n/n. If we can solve MCSP by a nonuniform algorithm of size 2o(N), then
G̃ would not be a secure condEP-PRG. ◀
▶ Remark 76. Theorem 73 and 74 are not exactly converses of each other, as there are two
gaps. First, there is a loss of 2O(
N log log N
log N ). Second, Theorem 73 only produces a (polynomial-
time computable) one-way function, but Theorem 74 requires a DLOGTIME-computable
one-way function to start with.
The first gap seems unavoidable given current knowledge about the maximum circuit
complexity. However, we believe that the second gap can be eliminated. In particular,
exponential average-case hardness of MCSP should imply a one-way function in DLOGTIME.
If there is a ⊕L heuristic algorithm for evaluating the truth table of a stack program,
then it is indeed true that exponential hardness of MCSP implies a one-way function in
DLOGTIME. Note that this heuristic only needs to succeed on most stack programs.18 For
example, if the circuit that corresponds to a uniformly random description has depth at most
O(log n) with high probability, then a ⊕L heuristic can evaluate the circuit up to a particular
depth, and still be correct on most inputs. We believe that a random stack program should
represent a shallow circuit (w.h.p.), but we are unable to prove it.
▶ Remark 77 (Results for MFSP). It is possible to extend Theorem 73 to the case of MFSP
(Minimum Formula Size Problem). In particular, suppose that MFSP is exponentially hard on
average, then there is a (super-polynomially hard) one-way function. Moreover, we only need
to compute truth tables of formulas to evaluate this one-way function, which is in ALOGTIME
[19], hence this one-way function is in ALOGTIME, and we obtain DLOGTIME-computable
one-way functions from Theorem 32. We omit the proof here, as it is essentially the same as
Theorem 73 except that it uses the best bounds for maximum formula complexity (see [57]
and references therein).
However, we are not aware of any “mass production theorem” (Theorem 72) for formulas.
Therefore we are not able to prove an MFSP-version of Theorem 74.
7 The Average-Case Complexity of MKtP
7.1 Characterizing One-Way Functions Using MKtP
We recall the main result of [62] showing an equivalence between the average-case hardness
of Kp for some polynomial p and the existence of one-way functions.
▶ Theorem 78 ([62]). The following are equivalent:
1. There is a polynomial p such that Kp is bounded-error hard on average.
2. One-way functions exist.
3. For every polynomial p(n) ≥ 2n and constant λ > 0, Kp is bounded-error hard on average
to approximate within an additive factor of λ log n.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, we show that a similar equivalence between the average-
case hardness of Kt and the existence of one-way functions. (Note that Kt is known to be
EXP-hard in the worst case under polynomial-size reductions [4].) The proof is very closely
analogous to the proofs in Section 4, exploiting the fact that “typical” strings of high Kt
complexity can be generated from their optimal descriptions in polynomial time. Hence we
just provide a sketch.
18 If this heuristic is always true (i.e. it is a worst-case algorithm), then ⊕L = P.
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▶ Theorem 79. The following are equivalent:
1. Kt is bounded-error hard on average.
2. One-way functions exist.
3. For every constant λ > 0, Kt is bounded-error hard on average to approximate within an
additive factor of λ log n.
Proof Sketch. (3) =⇒ (1) is trivial.
(1) =⇒ (2): the proof closely follows the proof of Theorem 33.
Suppose that there is a constant c such that every PPT algorithm computes Kt complexity
correctly on at most a 1−1/nc fraction of inputs. We observe that for all but a 1/n2c fraction
of inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n, optimal pairs (d, t) such that d + log t = Kt(x) have the property
that t ≤ O(n2c+1). Actually, for all but a 1/n2c fraction of inputs, K(x) ≥ n− 2c log n− 1,
while for all inputs x we have Kt(x) ≤ n + log n + O(1). Hence for all strings x with
K(x) ≥ n− 2c log n− 1, x can be generated from its optimal description in time O(n2c+1).
We define a weak one-way function f as follows. It takes as input a triple (ℓ, k, M), where
ℓ ∈ [n + log n], k ∈ [(2c + 1) log n], and M ∈ {0, 1}n+log n, and outputs (ℓ, k, out). Here out
is the result of running UM ′ for at most 2k steps, where M ′ is the ℓ-bit prefix of M . Just as
in Claim 35, the output distribution of f on a uniformly chosen input “almost dominates”
the uniform distribution. Assume there is an inverter for f , a heuristic algorithm for the
search version of Kt(x) can cycle over all possible ℓ and k, and find the optimal description
of x. As Kt is bounded-error hard on average, our candidate one-way function f is secure.
(2) =⇒ (3): We use Theorem 25 to construct a condEP-PRG G with stretch γ log n
and security 1/nγ from the presumed one-way function. Here, let c be a constant such that
G is computable in time nc, we choose γ = λ + c + 2.
We use an argument closely analogous to that of Lemma 39 to show that Kt is bounded-
error hard on average to approximate within an additive factor of λ log n. The idea is simple:
every output of the condEP-PRG has Kt complexity at most n + c log n + O(1), while a
random string of length n + γ log n is likely to have Kt complexity close to n + γ log n. Hence,
for our choice of parameters, an efficient heuristic algorithm that approximates Kt complexity
within an additive factor of λ log n can distinguish the outputs of G from random. ◀
Theorem 78 and Theorem 79 yield the following corollary.
▶ Corollary 80. Kt is bounded-error hard on average iff there is a polynomial p such that
Kp is bounded-error hard on average.
Corollary 80 gives a new non-trivial connection between meta-complexity problems that
seems hard to argue without using one-way functions as an intermediate notion.
7.2 A Complexity Theoretic Analogue
Theorem 79 shows that the weak average-case hardness of Kt is equivalent to the existence
of cryptographic pseudo-random generators. We next show that for a slightly different
setting of parameters, the average-case hardness of Kt is equivalent to the existence of
complexity-theoretic pseudo-random generators against non-uniform adversaries. Thus
average-case complexity of a single natural problem, namely Kt, can be used to characterize
both cryptographic pseudorandomness and complexity-theoretic pseudorandomness.
Recall that cryptographic PRGs are required to be computable in fixed polynomial time
but to be secure against adversaries that can run within any polynomial time bound. In
contrast, complexity-theoretic PRGs are allowed to use more resources than the adversary.
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▶ Definition 81. Given functions t : N→ N, ℓ : N→ N (satisfying ℓ(n) ≤ n for each n) and
s : N→ N, we say that a family of functions {Gn}, where Gn : {0, 1}ℓ(n) → {0, 1}n is a time
t pseudo-random generator (PRG) with seed length ℓ against size s if G(z) is computable in
time t(|z|) and for each n, Gn(Uℓ(n)) is 1/s(n)-indistinguishable from Un by size s(n) circuits.
The PRG is said to be seed-extending if z is a prefix of G(z) for each seed z.
Nisan and Wigderson [69, 13] showed how to base seed-extending complexity-theoretic
PRGs on the hardness of E (exponential-time). The parameters in the following theorem
statement are implicit in their main result.
▶ Theorem 82 ([69, 13]). If DTIME(2npoly(n)) ̸⊆ P/poly, then for each ℓ such that ℓ(n) =
nΩ(1), there is a seed-extending time 2ℓpoly(ℓ) PRG with seed length ℓ against polynomial
size.
We use Theorem 82 to derive an equivalence between the worst-case hardness of Kt,
the existence of complexity-theoretic PRGs with non-trivial seed length, and very mild
average-case hardness of Kt, where the hardness is against non-uniform adversaries. The
idea of the proof is similar to that of [4], who showed that computing Kt complexity is hard
for exponential-time under polynomial-size reductions.
▶ Theorem 83. The following are equivalent:
1. EXP ̸⊆ P/poly.
2. For each ϵ > 0, there is a time 2ℓpoly(ℓ) PRG with seed length nϵ against polynomial
size.
3. There are no polynomial size circuits for Kt.
4. For each ϵ > 0, there is a seed-extending time 2ℓpoly(ℓ) PRG with seed length nϵ against
polynomial size.
5. For any constant δ > 1/2, there are no polynomial size circuits computing Kt on a
1− 1/2δn fraction of inputs.
Proof. (1) ⇐⇒ (3) is shown in [4].
(1) ⇐⇒ (2) is shown in [69, 13].
(5) =⇒ (3) is trivial.
(3) =⇒ (4): We use Theorem 82. Kt can be computed in time O(2npoly(n)), and we
can define a decision version of Kt that is equivalent to the search version and computable in
time 2npoly(n) as follows: For x ∈ {0, 1}n and k ∈ [n + log n], (x, k) is a Yes instance of the
decision version of Kt iff Kt(x) ≤ k. By Theorem 82, the hardness of the decision version
implies that for each ϵ > 0, there is a seed-extending time 2mpoly(m) PRG with seed length
nϵ against polynomial size.
(4) =⇒ (5): Consider a seed-extending 2mpoly(m) time PRG G = {Gn} with seed
length γn, where 1/2 > γ > 1 − δ. Such a PRG is implied by a PRG with smaller seed
length, simply by truncating the output. Since the seed length is γn and the PRG is
computable in time 2γnpoly(n), we have that each output of the PRG has Kt complexity at
most 2γn + O(log n) < n− log n. On the other hand, a uniformly chosen input of length n
has Kt complexity very close to n, with high probability.
Suppose that there are polynomial size circuits {Cn} computing Kt on a 1−1/2δn fraction
of inputs. By our choice of δ, this means that they are correct on at least a 2/3 fraction
of strings Gn(z) for seed z of length γn. Now we can define a distinguisher D as follows:
D computes Cn(x) and accepts iff Cn(x) ≤ n− log(n). D accepts with probability 2/3 on
Gn(z) for uniformly chosen z, but with probability at most 1/3 on x for uniformly chosen x
of length n, since all but a o(1) fraction of strings have Kt(x) > n− log(n) and Cn answers
correctly on all but a o(1) fraction of these strings with high Kt complexity. Therefore D is
a distinguisher of polynomial size, contradicting the assumption that G is a PRG. ◀
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8 Open Problems
We conclude this paper with a few open questions.
Perebor hypotheses. How plausible are the Perebor hypotheses in Section 5.5? We believe
it is within reach to refute the non-uniform version of Hypothesis 66, by e.g. implementing
the inverter in [27] as circuits.
It would be exciting to refute the other Strong Perebor Hypotheses. Let t(n) be a
polynomial (say t(n) = 10n for simplicity). Is there a (probabilistic) algorithm running in
2n/nω(1) time that computes Kt in the worst-case? What about the average-case? Does
such algorithm imply new circuit lower bounds, as in the case of SAT algorithms [90] and
learning algorithms [72]? Is there a circuit family of 2n/nω(1) size that computes cKt (on
input length 2n = n + n)?
The Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis is used extensively in fine-grained complexity.
Conditioning on SETH, we can prove many polynomial lower bounds for problems in P
(e.g. the Orthogonal Vectors problem requires n2−o(1) time [89]). Do the Strong Perebor
Hypotheses imply non-trivial conditional lower bounds for natural problems in P?
Random circuits. Due to our limited knowledge about circuit complexity, the relations
presented in Section 6 are not tight. We point out a few questions whose resolution would
tighten the relationship between MCSP and one-way functions.
First, is there an efficiently samplable distribution over circuits, such that for most truth
table tt ∈ {0, 1}N , the probability that the optimal circuit for tt is sampled is at least
2−N /poly(N)? Such a distribution would imply a one-way function from super-polynomial
hardness of MCSP. The trivial solution as presented in Section 6.2 is to sample a uniformly
random circuit according to some encoding. The probability that the optimal circuit is
sampled is 2−N /2O(N
log log N
log N ).
Second, is there a ⊕L heuristic algorithm for evaluating a random circuit, that succeeds
on most circuits? Of course, this depends on the exact definition of “random” circuits. Such
a heuristic implies a DLOGTIME-computable one-way function from hardness of MCSP,
establishing a tighter converse of Theorem 74.
Last, does the existence of DLOGTIME-computable one-way functions imply the hardness
of MFSP? The main technical difficulty is that we do not have a formula version of
Theorem 72.
Other cryptographic primitives? Meta-complexity can characterize the existence of one-way
functions [62] and one-way functions in NC0 (this paper). Is there a similar characterization for
other cryptographic primitives, such as public-key encryption [75, 25], or indistinguishability
obfuscation [14]?
Is there a meta-complexity characterization of exponentially-hard strong one-way func-
tions? This would bring new insights to the old question of hardness amplification for one-way
functions that preserve exponential security [31].
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A Proof of Theorem 57
▶ Theorem 57. Let ϵ, δ, α, f be defined as in Construction 56. If ϵ ≥ 1/poly(n) and
L ≤ poly(n), then there is a function r : N→ N such that G = {Gn,r(n)}n∈N is a condEP-
PRG with stretch α and security 4ϵ.
More precisely, let ñ = n + 2d + d′. Suppose that for every subset D ⊆ {0, 1}ñ such that
H(G(D)) ≥ ñ− Ω(log( nδϵ )) and every k, there is an adversary of size s that 4ϵ-distinguishes
Gn,k(D) from the uniform random distribution. Then there is an adversary of size s ·
poly(nL/ϵ) that inverts f on a 1− δ fraction of inputs.
For convenience, we only consider non-uniform adversaries in this section. (See also Re-
mark 52.) Recall that we sometimes use a (multi-)set S to represent the uniform distribution
over S, and we assume that every one-way function is length-preserving.
A.1 Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Lemma
▶ Lemma 84 ([49]; see e.g., [12]). Let f be a candidate (weak) one-way function, ϵ, δ > 0.
Suppose for every E ⊆ {0, 1}n with |E| ≥ δ2 · 2
n, there is a circuit C of size s(n) such that
Pr
x←E
[C(f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))] ≥ ϵ.
Then there is a circuit of size O(s(n) · nϵ−2) that inverts f on a 1− δ fraction of inputs.
A.2 Step I: Making f Strong and Regular
Let f be a weak one-way function. The first step is to transform f into a strong and regular
one-way function, but only under a certain input distribution. In particular, we will define
a sequence of subsets X = {Xn} (that is not necessarily easy to sample), such that on the
uniform distribution over Xn, f is both strong and regular. Here:
We say f is strong on X , if every polynomial-size adversary A fails to invert f(X ) except
with negligible probability. (For comparison, we are only given that f is a weak one-way
function on a uniform random input: No PPT adversary inverts f on a (1−1/nc) fraction
of inputs, for some fixed constant c > 0.)
For a function r : N → N, we say f is r-regular on X , if for every n ∈ N and every
y ∈ fn(Xn), we have |f−1X (y)| ∈ [2r(n)−1, 2r(n)]. Here, f
−1
X (y) = {x ∈ X : f(x) = y}, and
|f−1X (y)| denotes the size of the above set.
As discussed in Section 5.2, we use the hardcore lemma to find a subset of inputs on
which f is strong. In particular, applying Lemma 84, we have:
▷ Claim 85. There is a sequence of subsets X ′ = {X ′n ⊆ {0, 1}n} with |X ′n| ≥ 2n/poly(n),
such that for every polynomial-size adversary A,
Pr
x←X ′n
[A(f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))] < negl(n).
More precisely, suppose that for every subset X ′n ⊆ {0, 1}n with |X ′n| ≥ δ2 · 2
n, there is an
adversary of size s that inverts fn(X ′n) w.p. at least ϵ. Then there is an adversary of size
O(s · nϵ−2) that inverts f on a 1− δ fraction of inputs. ◀
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Now, for every string y ∈ {0, 1}n, let |f−1X ′ (y)| denote the number of inputs x ∈ X ′n
such that f(x) = y. Let r ∈ [1, n], Wr be the number of strings x ∈ X ′n such that
|f−1X ′ (f(x))| ∈ [2r−1, 2r]. Then we have
∑n
r=1 Wr ≥ |X ′n|. By averaging, there is an integer
r ∈ [1, n] such that Wr ≥ |X ′n|/n. We denote r(n) to be this integer r, and
Xn := {x ∈ X ′n : |f−1X ′ (f(x))| ∈ [2
r−1, 2r]}.
By definition, f is r-regular on X := {Xn}. Since |Xn| ≥ |X ′n|/n, any adversary that
inverts Xn on an ϵ fraction of inputs also inverts X ′n on an ϵ/n fraction of inputs. To
summarize:
▷ Claim 86. There is a function r(n) ≤ n and a sequence of subsets X = {Xn} with
|Xn| ≥ 2n/poly(n), such that f is r-regular on X , and for every polynomial-size adversary A,
Pr
x←Xn
[A(f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))] < negl(n).
More precisely, suppose that for every function r : N → N and sequence of subsets
X = {Xn} such that |Xn| ≥ δ2n · 2
n and f is r-regular on X , there is an adversary of size
s that inverts fn(Xn) w.p. at least ϵ. Then there is an adversary of size s · poly(n/ϵ) that
inverts f on a 1− δ fraction of inputs. ◀
A.3 Step II: An Intermediate Function
We define another function ensemble f̃ = {f̃n}n∈N. Let k1 = r− 1, k2 = ⌊n− r− log(2n/δ)⌋,
and d = dExt(n, ϵ). We need the following two extractors:
a strong (k1, ϵ)-extractor Ext1 : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m1 , where m1 := k1−2 log(1/ϵ)−
O(1);
a strong (k2, ϵ)-extractor Ext2 : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m2 , where m2 := k2−2 log(1/ϵ)−
O(1).
The function f̃n : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}2d → {0, 1}m1+m2+2d is defined as follows.
f̃n(x, z1, z2) := z1 ◦ Ext1(x, z1) ◦ z2 ◦ Ext2(x, z2).
Denote ℓ(n) := m1 + m2 + 2d. The following lemma summarizes the properties of f̃n we
need:
▶ Lemma 87. For every integer n, the function f̃n satisfies the following properties:
1. (Uniformity) For every integer n, SD(f̃n(Xn,U2d),Uℓ(n)) ≤ 2ϵ.







More precisely, if there is an adversary A of size s that on input f̃n(Xn,U2d), guesses Xn
with success probability γ, then there is an adversary A′ of size O(s) that inverts fn(Xn)
w.p. at least O(γ/ϵ2).
Proof. (Uniformity) A sample from Xn can be obtained from two steps. First, we sample a
string y0 with probability p(y0) := Prx←Xn [fn(x) = y0]. Then we sample a string x0 with
probability p(x0 | y0) := Prx←Xn [x = x0 | fn(x) = y0].
Suppose y0 is fixed. Since f is r-regular, we have |f−1X (y0)| ≥ 2r−1. Therefore, conditioned
on y0, the min-entropy of the distribution of x0 is at least r − 1 ≥ k1.
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Let x← Xn and z1 ← Ud. Since Ext1 is a strong (k1, ϵ)-extractor, we have
SD(z1 ◦ Ext1(x, z1),Ud+m1 | f(x)) ≤ ϵ.
Now, for every y0 ∈ fn(Xn), since |f−1X (y0)| ≤ 2r, the probability that a sample of fn(Xn)
is equal to the particular y0 is at most 2r/|Xn|. It follows that the min-entropy of the
distribution of y0 is at least log(|Xn|/2r) ≥ n− r + log(δ/2n) ≥ k2. Since Ext2 is a strong
(k2, ϵ)-extractor, we have
SD(z2 ◦ Ext2(f(x), z2),Ud+m2) ≤ ϵ.
It follows that
SD(z1 ◦ Ext1(x, z1) ◦ z2 ◦ Ext2(f(x), z2),Uℓ(n))
≤SD(z1 ◦ Ext1(x, z1) ◦ z2 ◦ Ext2(f(x), z2),Ud+m1 ◦ z2 ◦ Ext2(f(x), z2))
+ SD(Ud+m1 ◦ z2 ◦ Ext2(f(x), z2),Uℓ(n))
≤ ϵ + ϵ = 2ϵ.
(Hiding) Let A be any adversary that violates the Hiding property. Suppose that
Pr
x←Xn
[A(f̃n(x,U2d)) = x] ≥ γ.
We will use A to build an algorithm A′ that inverts f(Xn) w.p. O(γ/ϵ2).
Let x← Xn be a hidden string, and y = fn(x) be the input of A′. We sample z1, z2 ← Ud.
We also “guess” a string z ← Um1 , with the hope that Ext1(x, z1) = z. Then we output
A′(y) := A(z1 ◦ z ◦ z2 ◦ Ext2(y, z2)).
Conditioned on Ext1(x, z1) = z, the distribution of z1 ◦ z ◦ z2 ◦ Ext2(y, z2) is exactly
f̃n(Xn,U2d). Therefore,
Pr[A′(y) = x] ≥ γ · Pr[Ext1(x, z1) = z] = γ · 2−m1 .
Note that besides y = f(x), A′ does not know any information about x. Therefore, for
every x′ ∈ f−1(y), the probability that A′(y) = x′ should also be at least γ · 2−m1 . We have
Pr
y=f(Xn)
[A′(y) ∈ f−1(y)] ≥ γ · 2−m1 · |f−1X (y)|
≥ γ · 2r−1−m1 = O(γ/ϵ2). ◀
A.4 Step III: Appending a Hardcore Function
Note that the output length of f̃n is τ := log(n/δ) + 4 log 1ϵ + O(1) bits shorter than the
input length of f̃n. In this section, we append a hardcore function at the end of f̃n, making
it a pseudorandom generator with stretch α > 0. In particular, we need:
a hardcore function HC : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d′ → {0, 1}k with distinguishing probability ϵ,
where k := τ + α, and d′ := dHC(n, k, ϵ). Let R be the reconstruction algorithm of this
hardcore function, and L := L(n, k, ϵ) be the list size.
Let ñ := n + 2d + d′. Recall that Gn,r : {0, 1}ñ → {0, 1}ñ+α is defined as
Gn,r(x, z1, z2, z3) := z1 ◦ Ext1(x, z1) ◦ z2 ◦ Ext2(f(x), z2) ◦ z3 ◦ HC(x, z3).
Let Eñ := Xn × {0, 1}2d+d
′ . In other words, a uniform random string from Eñ can be
sampled as x ◦ z, where x← Xn and z← U2d+d′ . We will show that Gn,r is a condEP-PRG
whose “condition” is Eñ. In particular, Lemma 88 shows that Gn,r(Eñ) is pseudorandom,
and Lemma 89 shows that Gn,r(Eñ) is entropy-preserving.
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▶ Lemma 88. Every polynomial-size adversary A fails to 4ϵ-distinguish Gn,r(Eñ) from
Uℓ(n)+d′+k.
More precisely, if there is an adversary A of size s that 4ϵ-distinguishes Gn,r(Eñ) from
Uℓ(n)+d′+k, then there is an adversary A′ of size s · poly(n/ϵ) that on input f̃n(Xn,U2d),
guesses Xn with success probability ϵ/2L.
Proof. Suppose A is an adversary that 4ϵ-distinguishes Gn,r(Eñ) from Uℓ(n)+d′+k.
Since SD(f̃n(Xn,U2d),Uℓ(n)) ≤ 2ϵ, it must be the case that A could 2ϵ-distinguish Gn,r(Eñ)
from f̃n(Xn,U2d) ◦ Ud′+k. Equivalently, let x← Xn, then given the information of f̃(x,U2d),
A could 2ϵ-distinguish Ud′ ◦HC(x,Ud′) from Ud′+k. We say a string w := (x, z1, z2) is good if
A could ϵ-distinguish f̃n(w) ◦ Ud′ ◦HC(x,Ud′) from f̃n(w) ◦ Ud′+k. Then by a Markov bound,
a random w← Xn ◦ U2d is good w.p. at least ϵ.
The adversary A′ that violates the (Hiding) property of f̃n simply follows from the
reconstruction algorithm R. In particular, on input f̃n(w) = f̃n(x, z1, z2), A′ constructs the
following oracle:
O(r) := A(f̃n(w) ◦ r),
runs the algorithm RO to obtain a list of size L, and outputs a random element in the list.
We analyze A′. Suppose A′ is given f̃n(w) for a good w, then O indeed ϵ-distinguishes
Ud′ ◦ HC(x,Ud′) from Ud′+k. Therefore, w.p. ≥ 1/2, x is in the list outputted by RO. If this
is the case, we will correctly output x w.p. ≥ 1/L. It follows that on input f̃n(x,U2d) where
x← Xn, A′ outputs x w.p. ≥ ϵ/2L. Finally, as R is a polynomial-size oracle circuit (actually
a PPT oracle machine), the size of A′ is s(n) · poly(n/ϵ). ◀
▶ Lemma 89. Suppose that ϵ < 110n2 . Then H(Gn,r(Eñ)) ≥ ñ− τ − 2.
Proof. Since SD(f̃n(Xn,U2d),Uℓ(n)) ≤ 2ϵ < 1ℓ(n)2 , by [62, Lemma 2.2], we have
H(f̃n(Xn,U2d)) ≥ ℓ(n)− 2. It follows that H(Gn,r(Eñ)) ≥ (ℓ(n)− 2) + d′ ≥ ñ− τ − 2. ◀
A.5 Putting It Together
Proof of Theorem 57. Suppose that for every X = {Xn} that satisfies the premise of
Claim 86, and Eñ defined above, there is an adversary of size s(n) that 4ϵ-distinguishes
Gn,r(Eñ) from the uniform distribution. Then:
By Lemma 88, there is an adversary of size s(n) · poly(n/ϵ) that on input f̃(Xn,Ud1+d2),
guesses Xn w.p. ≥ ϵ/2L.
By Lemma 87, there is an adversary of size s(n) ·poly(n/ϵ) that inverts fn(Xn) w.p. ≥ 12ϵL .
It follows from Claim 86 that there is an adversary of size s · poly(nL/ϵ) that inverts f
on a 1− δ fraction of inputs. ◀
B Proof of Theorem 62
In this section, we briefly review the universal hash functions in [56] that are computable
by linear-size circuits, with an emphasis on the uniformity of these circuits. Throughout
this section, a circuit family is uniform if it satisfies Definition 60. An XOR-circuit is a
(multi-output) circuit that only uses XOR gates of fan-in 2. To match Definition 60, we also
require that every gate in an XOR-circuit has fan-out at most 2.
For convenience, we denote [n] = {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}, and (n) = {0, 1}n.
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Outline. Our start point is the strongly explicit family of expanders by [64, 29]. Spielman [78]
showed that these expanders imply asymptotically optimal error-correcting codes (i.e., with
constant rate and constant relative distance). Using an expander walk trick, for any constant
ϵ > 0, one could construct error-correcting codes with relative distance 1− ϵ, constant rate,
and constant alphabet size. By the construction of [56], such codes imply universal hash
functions.
B.1 Strongly Explicit Expanders
We use the following construction due to [64, 29]. (See also [45, Construction 8.1].) For every
integer n, we have a graph Gn with n2 vertices such that every vertex has degree 8. The
vertex set of Gn is Zn × Zn. Each vertex v = (x, y) is adjacent to the following vertices
γ1(v) = (x + 2y, y), γ2(v) = (x + 2y + 1, y), γ3(v) = (x, y + 2x), γ4(v) = (x, y + 2x + 1).
Here the additions are modulo n. Note that γ1, . . . , γ4 are bijections, and the other four
neighbors of v are simply γ−11 (v), . . . , γ
−1
4 (v). The graph might contain self-loops or parallel
edges.
▶ Theorem 90 ([29]). For every integer n ≥ 1, the second largest eigenvalue of the adjacency
matrix of Gn is at most 5
√
2 < 8.
In our construction, we need the degree of the expanders to be a large enough constant.
We can simply pick a large enough constant k and take the k-th power of Gn. Let Gkn be the
k-th power of Gn, i.e., for every u, v ∈ V (Gn), the number of (parallel) edges between u and
v in Gkn is equal to the number of length-k paths between u and v in Gn. Then the degree of




▶ Remark 91. It will be convenient to define an explicit mapping (bijection) between E(Gkn)
and [dn2/2]. Note that each edge (u, v) ∈ Gkn can be represented by a start vertex u and a






4 }. The meaning of
this representation is that (σ1 ◦ σ2 ◦ · · · ◦ σk)(u) = v. Each edge has two representations:
(u, σ1σ2 . . . σk) or (v, σ−1k σ
−1
k−1 . . . σ
−1
1 ). We arbitrarily choose a size-(d/2) subset S of Σk
such that for each σ1, σ2, . . . , σk ∈ Σ, exactly one of σ1σ2 . . . σk and σ−1k σ
−1
k−1 . . . σ
−1
1 is in
S. We fix and hardcode a bijection between [d/2] and S. Given an integer i ∈ [dn2/2],
we interpret i as a pair of v ∈ V (Gkn) and σ1σ2 . . . σk ∈ S, and the edge corresponding to
i is represented as (v, σ1σ2 . . . σk). This bijection and its inverse are computable in time
O(log n).
B.2 Error-Reduction Codes
An intermediate step in [78] is to construct error-reduction codes, which are weaker primitives
compared to error-correcting codes.
Let r, δ, ϵ > 0 be constants. Recall that we defined (n) = {0, 1}n for convenience. An
error-reduction code of rate r, error reduction ϵ and reducible distance δ is a function
C : (rn)→ ((1− r)n) mapping rn “message” bits into (1− r)n “check” bits, such that the
following holds. The codeword of a message x is x ◦ C(x). For any message x, if we are given
a corrupted codeword that differs from x ◦ C(x) with at most v ≤ δn message bits and at
most t ≤ δn check bits, then we can recover a codeword that differs from x ◦ C(x) in at most
ϵt bits. (We will not be particularly interested in the complexity of recovery or decoding
algorithms.)
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▶ Lemma 92. For some absolute constants ϵ < 1 and δ > 0, there is a family of error-
reduction codes R = {Rn : (n)→ (⌊n/2⌋)} with error-reduction ϵ and reducible distance δ.
Moreover, the sequence of functions {Rn} can be computed by a uniform family of linear-size
XOR-circuits.
Proof Sketch. First, let m be the smallest integer such that dm2/2 ≥ n. Note that m can
be computed in O(log n) time. Let r = 9/10, then for large enough n, dm2(1− r)/r ≤ n/2.
It suffices to construct an error-reduction code with dm2/2 message bits and dm2(1− r)/r
check bits.
We use [78, Definition 16], where B is the edge-vertex incidence graph of Gkm, and S is a
good (linear) error-correcting code on d-bit messages that has rate r. (Since d is a constant,
we can hardcode S in our algorithm. on the other hand, since d is large enough, S exists.)
An equivalent formulation is as follows. We assign a message bit to every edge of Gkm.
For each vertex v ∈ V (Gkm), let b1b2 . . . bd be the bits on the d incident edges of v. This
vertex outputs d(1 − r)/r check bits which are the check bits of S on message b1b2 . . . bd.
Concatenating the outputs of each vertex, we obtain an error-reduction code of dm2/2
message bits and dm2(1− r)/r check bits. By [78, Lemma 18], for some absolute constants
ϵ < 1 and δ > 0, this error-reduction code has error-reduction ϵ and reducible distance δ.
Computing the i-th gate of the encoding circuit reduces to computing the indices of
the incident edges of a vertex v ∈ V (Gkm). By Remark 91, this is computable in O(log n)
time. ◀
We actually need error-reduction codes with error-reduction ϵ = 1/2. We can simply
iterate the code in Lemma 92 for O(1) times. The encoding circuit is still uniform. Therefore,
we have:
▶ Corollary 93. Lemma 92 holds for ϵ = 1/2.
B.3 Error-Correcting Codes
The construction in [78, Section II] transforms an error-reduction code into an error-correcting
code. Here we only review its encoding algorithm and check that they can be implemented
by uniform XOR circuits. The correctness of this error-correcting code is proved in [78].
▶ Lemma 94. There is a constant n0 > 1 and a family C =
{
Ck : (n02k−2)→ (n02k)
}
of error-correcting codes with constant relative distance. Moreover, C can be encoded by a
uniform family of linear-size XOR circuits.
Proof Sketch. We recursively define Ck as follows. First, C0 : (n0/4) → (n0) is any good
enough error-correcting code. Since n0 is a constant, our algorithm can hardcode C0.
Now, let k ≥ 1, we define Ck as follows. Let x ∈ (n02k−2) be the inputs of Ck.
The first n02k−2 outputs of Ck will always be x itself.19 Note that we require the fan-out
of gates to be at most 2, therefore we need to make a copy of x. Similarly, we may need
to copy the Ak, Bk, Ck defined below. The circuit size is still linear in 2k.
We pick an error-reduction code Rk−2 : (n02k−2)→ (n02k−3), and output Ak := Rk−2(x).
Let Ck−1 : (n02k−3)→ (n02k−1) be the error-correcting code we recursively defined. Let
Ak ◦Bk := Ck−1(Ak), and we output Bk. (Recall that the first n02k−3 outputs of Ck−1 is
equal to its inputs, i.e., Ak.)
We pick an error-reduction code Rk−1 : (n02k−1) → (n02k−2), and output Ck :=
Rk−1(Ak ◦Bk).
19 We can assume this is also true for C0.
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The required error-reduction codes are constructed in Corollary 93. The total number of
output bits of Ck is |x|+ |Ak|+ |Bk|+ |Ck| which is indeed n02k.
The i-th gate of the encoding circuit of Ck−1 can be computed as follows. Let c2k be the
circuit complexity of the first, second, and fourth bullet. (That is, circuit complexity of Ck
not counting the recursive part for Ck−1.) We may assume c is a power of 2. The encoding
circuit for Ck has |C0|+
∑k
i=1 c2i = |C0|+ c(2k+1 − 1) gates. Taking the (base-2) logarithm
of (i− |C0|)/c, we can find the “level of recursion” that the i-th gate is constructed. Then
the problem reduces to computing the encoding circuit of Rj for some integer j, which is
computable in O(log n) time. ◀
For every constant ϵ > 0, the construction of [56] needs a code with relative distance
1− ϵ and constant alphabet size. As in [7, 35], we can “amplify” the code in Lemma 94 by
an expander:
▶ Lemma 95. For every constant ϵ > 0, there is a constant D > 0 and a family of error-
correcting codes {C′k : (n02k−2)→ [2D]O(2
k)} that has relative distance 1− ϵ. Moreover, if we
interpret [2D] as length-D strings, then C′k can be encoded by a uniform family of linear-size
XOR circuits.
Proof Sketch. Recall that {Gn} is the expander family constructed in Theorem 90, and
{Ck : (n02k−2)→ (n02k)} is the family of error-correcting codes constructed in Lemma 94.
Let m be the smallest integer such that m2 ≥ n02k. We pad zeros to the outputs of Ck, thus
Ck can be regarded as a code that outputs m2 bits. We assign an output bit of Ck to each
vertex in Gm. The relative distance of Ck is still lower bounded by an absolute constant
δ > 0.
We will pick a large enough constant p, such that Gpm has good expansion property: Every
subset of V (Gpm) with size at least δ · m2 has at least (1 − ϵ)m2 neighbors. (See e.g. [7,
Corollary 1].) Let D := 8p, so every vertex in Gpm has degree D. On input x ∈ (n02k−2), recall
that we assigned each vertex in V (Gpm) a bit of the codeword Ck(x). For every v ∈ V (Gpm),
the vertex v will output the concatenation of the bits assigned to its neighbor, which can be
interpreted as an element in [2D]. The code C′k(x) simply concatenates the outputs of each
vertex v ∈ V (Gpm) together.
Consider the encoding circuits of C′k. As we need each gate to have fanout at most 2, we
make D copies of the encoding circuit of Ck. For every σ = σ1σ2 . . . σk ∈ Σk, we have a copy
of Ck denoted as Cσk . For each vertex v, and each σ ∈ Σk, let u be the σ-th neighbor of v.
The σ-th bit of the output of v is the u-th output of the circuit Cσk . We can see this encoding
circuit is uniform. ◀
▶ Remark 96. Lijie Chen (personal communication) suggested a similar approach based on
expander random walks [80, Proposition 6.6]. As the p-th power of an expander graph G
consists of length-p walks in G, the two approaches are essentially the same.
B.4 Universal Hash Functions
Finally, we are ready to verify that the universal hash functions in [56] are uniform.
▶ Theorem 62. For every integer n, m where m = O(n), there exists an integer k = O(n),
and a family of universal hash functions {hn,m : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}k → {0, 1}m}, such that hn,m
can be computed by a uniform family of linear-size circuits that are skew w.r.t. the second
argument.
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Proof Sketch. Let n1 := cn for a large enough constant c, ϵ be a small enough constant,
and D be the constant in Lemma 95 depending on ϵ. We need three ingredients:
An ℓ-exposure resilient function (ERF) ERF : {0, 1}n1D → {0, 1}m [21]. It is shown in [24]
that for any (linear) error-correcting code C : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n with generator matrix G
and minimum distance d, the transpose matrix GT mapping n input bits to m output
bits is a perfect ℓ-ERF where ℓ := n− d + 1.
For an XOR-circuit C that computes the linear transform G over GF(2), we can obtain a
circuit computing the linear transform GT, by exchanging the input gates and output
gates and reversing the directions of every wire [18, 56]. In particular, every gate g ∈ C
whose output feeds to the gates g1, g2, . . . , gk becomes, in the new circuit, an XOR gate g
whose inputs are g1, g2, . . . , gk.
Therefore, Lemma 94 shows that an ℓ-ERF ERF : {0, 1}n1D → {0, 1}m is computable by
a uniform family of linear-size XOR circuits.
An error-correcting code C′k : {0, 1}n → [2D]n1 with relative distance 1−ϵ, as in Lemma 95.
A hash family H : {0, 1}D×{0, 1}2D−1 → {0, 1}D, computable by a skew circuit w.r.t. the
second argument. As D is a constant, we can simply hardcode this hash family. (See
e.g. Section 5.2.1 for an instantiation based on Toeplitz matrices.)
The construction of [56] goes as follows. On input x ∈ {0, 1}n, we first compute
C′(x) ∈ [2h+1]n1 . Next, we receive n1 keys k1, k2, . . . , kn1 ∈ {0, 1}2h+1 which are the keys for
our hash function. Let t ∈ [2h+1]n1 be the following message: ti := H(C′(x)i, ki). We treat t
as a string of length m(h + 1), and the output of our hash function is ERF(t).
It is easy to see that this family is uniform. ◀
